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to hold that the state was under a constitutional duty to protect the fetus from deprivations of its interest in life
by the pregnant woman. In this article, we suggest that Canadian constitutional law scholars and reproductive
rights advocates would benefit from examining the German abortion decisions despite their highly
controversial nature. In our view, the benefits are twofold. First, the German cases demonstrate that
recognizing the protective function can help clarify constitutional doctrine by revealing the tensions that
underlie many difficult constitutional cases. Second, a synthetic reading of the German and Canadian Courts’
abortion jurisprudence generates a more fulsome and nuanced analysis of the issues raised in the those cases,
as well as additional critical commentary on the Courts’ analyses and conclusions.
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The German Abortion Decisions and
the Protective Function in German
and Canadian Constitutional Law
Vanessa MacDonnell & Jula Hughes *
In the First and Second Abortion decisions, the German Constitutional Court drew on earlier
jurisprudence to hold that the state was under a constitutional duty to protect the fetus from
deprivations of its interest in life by the pregnant woman. In this article, we suggest that Canadian constitutional law scholars and reproductive rights advocates would benefit from
examining the German abortion decisions despite their highly controversial nature. In our view,
the benefits are twofold. First, the German cases demonstrate that recognizing the protective
function can help clarify constitutional doctrine by revealing the tensions that underlie many
difficult constitutional cases. Second, a synthetic reading of the German and Canadian
Courts’ abortion jurisprudence generates a more fulsome and nuanced analysis of the
issues raised in the those cases, as well as additional critical commentary on the Courts’
analyses and conclusions.
Dans ses deux premiers jugements sur l’avortement, la Cour constitutionnelle allemande,
se fondant sur une jurisprudence reconnaissant l’obligation pour l’État de protéger
d’intervention privée les droits constitutionnels d’une personne, a fait valoir que l’État avait
le devoir constitutionnel de protéger le fœtus d’une dépossession de son droit à la vie par
la femme enceinte. Dans cet article, nous suggérons que les constitutionnalistes et les
défenseurs des droits en matière de reproduction canadiens auraient intérêt à étudier, les
jugements allemands sur l’avortement malgré leur nature fortement controversée. Nous
faisons valoir que cela représente un double avantage. En premier lieu, la comparaison avec
l’Allemagne démontre que la reconnaissance de la fonction de protection peut clarifier la doctrine
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constitutionnelle en dévoilant les tensions qui caractérisent de nombreux cas constitutionnels de
nature complexe. En second lieu, une lecture synthétique des jurisprudences allemande et
canadienne sur l’avortement permet d’obtenir une analyse plus exhaustive et nuancée des
enjeux que soulèvent les cas d’avortement dans chacun de ces pays et de formuler de nouveaux commentaires critiques sur l’analyse et les conclusions des tribunaux.
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In 1975 and 1992, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) heard successive challenges to the decriminalization of abortion by the
German Federal Parliament (Bundestag). In the highly controversial First1 and
Second2 Abortion decisions, the Court held that the state had a constitutional
obligation to protect the fetus3 from deprivations of its interest in life by the

1.

2.

3.

Schwangerschaftsabbruch I, (1975) 39 BVerfGE 1 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany) [First Abortion
decision] [translated by author, Jula Hughes]. There is no official English translation of
this decision. We have relied exclusively on the original German text for our analysis. The
Supreme Court of Canada has relied on a translation by Robert Jonas and John Gorby in one
of its own decisions on the constitutionality of criminalizing abortion. See Robert E Jonas
and John D Gorby, “West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade” (1976)
9:3 J Marshall J Prac & Proc 605, cited in R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 at para 2, DLR
(4th) 385 [Morgentaler].
Schwangerschaftsabbruch II, (1993) 88 BverfGE 203 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany) [Second
Abortion decision]. An official English translation is available on the website of the German
Constitutional Court. See BVerfGE, 2 BvF 2/90 (28 May 1993), online: <http://www.
bverfg.de/entscheidungen/fs19930528_2bvf000290en.html>.
Following the Supreme Court of Canada in Morgentaler (supra note 1), we use the terms
“fetus” and “fetal life” throughout, recognizing that they are inaccurate when applied to the
first ten weeks of pregnancy following the last menstrual period. The German Constitutional
Court uses the term nasciturus, which might be better translated as prenatal life. See e.g. First
Abortion decision, supra note 1 at para 119.
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pregnant woman.4 In doing so, the Court also recognized a broader right to have
constitutional interests secured by the state against intrusions by private actors.5
It held that where a power imbalance between private actors renders constitutional
interests vulnerable to deprivation, the state is required to intervene to protect the
interests of the weaker party.6
In both decisions, the Court was unanimously of the view that the objective normative framework of the constitution required the state to protect the fetal interest in
life. In the First Abortion decision, the majority concluded that the state could
only fulfill this obligation using the criminal law. The dissenters rejected the
majority’s approach, explaining that the criminal law was an unnecessary and
inappropriate tool for regulating abortion. In the Second Abortion decision, a
majority of the Court resiled from the position of the earlier majority on the necessity
of criminalization, and concluded that the state might validly protect fetal life in
a range of ways. In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted aspects of the
dissenters’ arguments in the First Abortion decision. The dissenters had suggested that the best way of protecting fetal life is often to ensure that women
have sufficient social supports.
Canadian academics schooled in the tradition of Morgentaler7 and the American
cases of Roe v Wade8 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey9
are likely to regard the German Abortion decisions as unsettling, both jurisprudentially and politically. Indeed, there is much to criticize in the two decisions,
foremost among which is the Court’s “patriarchal claim that a woman has a moral
4.
5.

6.

7.
8.
9.

For a discussion of the distinction between “rights” and “interests” in this context, see Vanessa
A MacDonnell, “The Protective Function and Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms” (2012) 17:1 Rev Const Stud 53 at 54-55, n 5 [MacDonnell, “Protective Function”].
By “private actors” we mean any “third-party actor,” as that term is used by Mark Tushnet.
See Mark Tushnet, “The Relationship Between Judicial Review of Legislation and the
Interpretation of Non-Constitutional Law, With Reference to Third Party Effect” in András
Sajó & Renáta Uitz, eds, The Constitution in Private Relations: Expounding Constitutionalism
(Utrecht: Eleven International, 2005) 167. For a general discussion of the protective
function, see MacDonnell, “Protective Function,” supra note 4.
Since the First Abortion decision, the protective function has been invoked in a variety
of contexts, including terror threats, dangers arising from the technological development
of nuclear power and electromagnetic applications, noise generated by air and road
traffic, chemical pollution and damage to air and forests, protections of universities, and
the maintenance of existing private schools. See Bodo Pieroth & Bernhard Schlinck,
Grundrechte: Staatsrecht II (Heidelberg: Müller, 2012) at para 111.
Morgentaler, supra note 1.
Roe v Wade (1973), 410 US 113, 93 S Ct 705 [Roe v Wade].
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey (1992), 505 US 833, 112 S Ct 2791
[Casey].
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obligation, except in extraordinary circumstances, to continue her pregnancy to
birth.”10 This has not stopped scholars in the United States from comparing Roe v
Wade to the First Abortion decision and Casey to the Second Abortion decision.11
Much of this comparative analysis is focussed on judicial outcomes and German
scholars writing in English have often struggled to convey the sophistication and
nuance of the German decisions.12 To date, Canadian scholars have not contributed
significantly to this comparative scholarship. It may be that Canadian scholars
are largely satisfied with the result in Morgentaler, or that they are concerned about
keeping the abortion issue on the political agenda. Whatever the reasons, it is clear
that the First and Second Abortion decisions hold important insights for Canadian
constitutional law scholars (especially feminist constitutional scholars13), as well as for
reproductive rights advocates.
10. Nanette Funk, “Abortion Counselling and the 1995 German Abortion Law” (1996) 12:1
Conn J Int’l L 33 at 51. See also Reva B Siegel, “The Constitutionalization of Abortion” in
Michael Rosenfeld & András Sajó, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 1057 at 1067 [Siegel, “Constitutionalization of
Abortion”]. The Court’s claim in this regard is overt and strongly worded: “The protection of
the life of the child in utero takes precedence as a matter of principle for the entire duration
of the pregnancy over the right of the pregnant woman to self-determination and may not
be placed in question for any particular time” (First Abortion decision, supra note 1 at para
3). Note that the decisions of the German Constitutional Court are reported in two parts.
The first part is titled, “Urteil,” i.e. judgment, but is more limited than the word suggests. It
is a Court-articulated ratio decidendi. The second part is titled, Begründung, i.e. reasons. The
preceding quote is from the first part.
11. See Siegel, “Constitutionalization of Abortion,” supra note 10; Reva B Siegel, “Dignity
and Sexuality: Claims on Dignity in Transnational Debates over Abortion and Same-Sex
Marriage” (2012) 10:2 Int’l J Const L 355; Mark Tushnet & Vicki Jackson, Comparative
Constitutional Law, 2d ed (New York: Foundation Press, 2006); Jonas & Gorby, supra note
1; Richard E Levy & Alexander Somek, “Paradoxical Parallels in the American and German
Abortion Decisions” (2001) 9 Tul J Int’l & Comp L 109; Julie George, “Political Effects of
Court Decisions on Abortion: A Comparison between the United States and the German
Federal Republic” (1989) 3 Int’l J L & Fam 106. For a more extensive list, see Siegel,
“Constitutionalization of Abortion,” supra note 10 at 1057-58, nn 1-3.
12. But see Albin Eser, “Reform of German Abortion Law: First Experiences” (1986) 34:2 Am J
Comp L 369. Professor Eser is an eminent scholar in the area of comparative abortion law.
He headed a multi-year study by the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International
Criminal Law in Freiburg, and a brief he prepared for the German Constitutional Court in
the Second Abortion decision proved highly influential.
13. See Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez & Tsvi Kahana, “Introduction: The Idea and
Practice of Feminist Constitutionalism” in Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez & Tsvi
Kahana, eds, Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012) 1.
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Why should Canadian scholars look for inspiration and guidance to two
decisions that appear to be fundamentally at odds with deeply held convictions
about both constitutional law and reproductive rights? After all, the protective
function invoked by the German Constitutional Court to impose a positive duty
on the state to shield the fetus from deprivations of life is hardly consistent with a
liberal conception of constitutional rights, which emphasizes the defensive function of negative rights. And while the protective function’s focus on protecting
the vulnerable might imply that it is a progressive force in constitutional law, the
suggestion that the interests of the fetus have constitutional weight is likely to be
deeply troubling to feminists, who rightly fear that increased protection of fetal
life may erode existing protections of women’s reproductive rights.
In this article, we suggest that there are at least two reasons why the German
cases warrant careful study. First, the German cases demonstrate that recognizing
the protective function can help clarify constitutional doctrine by revealing the
tensions that underlie many difficult constitutional cases. While the Supreme
Court of Canada has occasionally given effect to claims of a protective character,
it has done so either by re-characterizing them in terms of negative rights and
resolving them within the standard Charter14 framework, or by recognizing the
government’s protective function in passing at the “pressing and substantial
objective” stage of the Oakes analysis.15 It would be preferable for the Supreme
Court to develop a coherent theory of protective rights, and the German example
provides a useful guide.
Second, a synthetic reading of the German and Canadian abortion jurisprudence is mutually informing. In each body of jurisprudence, the applicants
foreground certain aspects of the constitutional issue in framing their claim,
while other aspects are pushed to the margins or surface only weakly. Arguably,
one of the major differences between the German and Canadian (and US) cases
is not their divergent outcomes, but the way in which the cases came before
the courts. In both North American examples, women or advocates on behalf
of women challenged restrictive legislative and regulatory frameworks governing
abortion. In Germany, progressive political majorities that had liberalized abor14. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), c 11 [Charter].
15. See R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) [Oakes cited to SCR]; Sujit Choudhry,
“So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality Analysis under the
Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 501 at 514 [Choudhry, “Legacy
of Oakes”]; Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare
Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009)
at 203-07 [Tushnet, Weak Courts].
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tion laws were faced with constitutional challenges from conservative opposition
parties.16 By reading the German and Canadian cases together, we get the benefit
of a more fulsome and nuanced analysis of the issues, as well as additional critical
commentary on each Court’s analyses and conclusions. For example, the German
Constitutional Court is much more articulate than its Canadian counterpart on
the issue of the special relationship between the pregnant woman and the fetus,
and the way in which their interests frequently align. It has also demonstrated a
greater concern for the impact of pregnancy on women’s equality rights. Moreover, the jurisprudence is as illuminating in those moments when the German
Constitutional Court falters as it is when it gets it right. While the German
Constitutional Court quite usefully explores the conceptual difficulty of having
rights without a rights-holder, it does so in response to an innovative, yet unprincipled analysis in the First Abortion decision.
What about the risks of engaging in this analysis? As feminist constitutional
scholars, we are not immune to the anxiety associated with engaging the
German jurisprudence in a post-Morgentaler environment. However, we take
some comfort in the fact that German women do not face greater barriers to
obtaining an abortion than Canadian women, despite the German Constitutional
Court’s willingness to recognize that the state should afford certain protections
to the fetus. This suggests that successful reproductive rights advocacy may not
depend as crucially as is generally thought upon securing judicial support for the
proposition that the fetus is a legal nullity. This is a potentially significant insight
for reproductive rights advocates and for feminist constitutional scholars. A great
deal of effort has been expended advocating for a conception of reproductive
rights that largely excludes the fetus from view.17 This treatment of fetal life may
ultimately prove vulnerable because its legal conceptualization strays too far from
everyday experience and majoritarian moral intuition. Reading the Canadian
and the German jurisprudence together suggests that a more solid constitutional
16. One of the strengths of comparative analysis, both in literature and in law, is that it is
inherently demanding of inclusiveness of the Other. A surface reading of the Canadian
and German case law suggests that the Canadian decisions are progressive and the German
decisions are reactionary. It would be easy to extrapolate from this to viewing the Canadian
law as progressive and the German law as reactionary. A close comparative reading reminds
us that this view is myopic. Progressive lawmakers in Germany commanded a solid majority
both in 1975 and in 1993, while in Canada progress had to be achieved through legal
challenge. On the theoretical point, see Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek, Comparative Literature:
Theory, Method, Application (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998) at 17.
17. See LW Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1981) at 40; Bonnie Steinbock, Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and
Fetuses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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foundation might be built upon a doctrine that secures the reproductive rights of
women while also accepting the state’s interest in protecting fetal life, an interest usually best advanced by recognizing that the interests of women and the fetus are aligned.18
To be clear, we are not suggesting that the majority’s approach in the First
Abortion decision should be emulated in Canada. We are certainly not advocating
for a dilution of women’s reproductive rights. Instead, we argue that constitutional
rights litigation often takes place within a space of contest between the protective
function on the one hand and the defensive rights of the individual on the other.19
Understanding constitutional cases in this way makes it possible to give legal
recognition and voice to the forces that underlie constitutional discourse. These
forces are muted but no less powerful for that muteness in a jurisprudence that insists
upon an exclusive focus on defensive rights. What emerges from the German
cases and associated commentary is that the best way of reconciling these two
aspects of the constitutional doctrine in the abortion context is usually to adopt
more “woman-friendly”20 state policies.21 In sum, our focus in this article is on
constructing a robust conceptualization of the reproductive rights of women,
one capable of withstanding the most rigorous constitutional scrutiny, as well as
changes in political winds.22 Recent events suggest that such efforts are needed.23
18. Siegel, “Constitutionalization of Abortion,” supra note 10 at 1070. Siegel refers to the Second
Abortion decision. See supra note 2.
19. For a similar view, see Siegel, “Constitutionalization of Abortion,” supra note 10.
20. See Second Abortion decision, supra note 2 at para 170. See also the commentary in note 69,
infra.
21. For commentary on the German cases, see Siegel, “Constitutionalization of Abortion,” supra
note 10 at 1070; Gerald Neuman, “Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to
Protection in the United States and Germany” (1995) 43:2 Am J Comp L 272, reprinted in
Vicki C Jackson & Mark Tushnet, eds, Comparative Constitutional Law, 2d ed (New York:
Foundation Press, 2006) 129 at 130, 132.
22. On the current vulnerability of Canadian abortion law in changing political climates, see
Chris Kaposy & Jocelyn Downie, “Judicial Reasoning About Pregnancy and Choice” (2008)
16 Health LJ 281.
23. In February 2012, Stephen Woodworth, a Conservative Member of Parliament, sponsored
a motion in the House of Commons seeking to have a Committee “appointed and directed
to review the declaration in Subsection 223(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada which states
that a child becomes a human being only at the moment of complete birth.” See Stephen
Woodworth, “Motion 312” (2013), online: <http://www.stephenwoodworth.ca/canadas400-year-old-definition-of-human-being/motion-312>. Many, including the Prime Minister,
viewed the motion as an attempt to put the abortion question back on the political agenda.
Although the motion failed to pass, it was supported by ninety-one MPs, including eight
Cabinet Ministers. See “Tory Backbencher’s Abortion Motion Defeated 203-91 despite
Support from High-Profile MPs including Jason Kenney” National Post (26 September
2012), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/09/26/tory-backbenchers-abortion-
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The most useful elements of the German approach for Canadian scholars
become apparent once the Constitutional Court’s formulation of the protective
function is pared down to its essential components, and “mediating ideas” are
identified to facilitate the task of comparison. By “mediating ideas,” we mean
concepts that appear to be essential elements of both countries’ jurisprudence.24
Mediating ideas emerge most clearly when we consider the dissenting opinion in
the First Abortion decision.
This article is structured as follows. In Part I we discuss the First and Second
Abortion decisions in some detail. In Part II, we consider the implications of the
protective function for Canadian constitutional law. In Part III, we explore how
reading the German and Canadian decisions together can assist in developing a
doctrine of reproductive rights that accounts more fully for the legal interests and
special relationships at stake in these cases, with particular emphasis on the right
of access to abortion.

I. The First and Second Abortion Decisions
The German Constitutional Court’s abortion jurisprudence is interesting, if
somewhat startling. In the family of liberal democracies whose constitutions
feature a catalogue of fundamental rights, it is difficult to find a court whose
approach to abortion is more at odds with those of the Supreme Court of Canada
and the United States Supreme Court. At the same time, the lived experience
of German women is not terribly different than that of their North American
counterparts. There, as here, women can access abortion legally, though there is
considerable local variation in the administrative hurdles that a woman may face
in seeking an abortion.25

motion-defeated-203-91-despite-support-from-several-high-profile-mps>. The death of
Henry Morgentaler in May 2013 has also revived discussions about abortion. See “Dr.
Henry Morgentaler’s Death Highlights Abortion Divide” CBC News (29 May 2013), online:
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2013/05/29/morgentaler-death-reax.html>.
24. We adopt the concept of mediating ideas from comparative literary theory. See Tötösy de
Zepetnek, supra note 16 at 133-34.
25. Rahman, Katzive, and Henshaw group Germany and Canada in the category of countries
with liberal abortion laws. See Anika Rahman, Laura Katzive & Stanley K Henshaw, “A
Global Review of Laws on Induced Abortion, 1985-1997” (1998) 24:2 Int’l Fam Planning
Perspectives 56 at 62. For a similar observation regarding the legal and lived experience
dimensions of abortion in the United States and Germany, see Myra Marx Ferree et al,
Shaping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 3-4.
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A. The First Abortion Decision

As noted above, the abortion issue came before the Constitutional Court in a
very different litigation context than it did in Canada. In 1974, the West German
federal parliament passed a law decriminalizing abortion in the first trimester of
pregnancy, but maintaining the threat of criminal sanction against both physicians and women in the later stages of pregnancy. The proposed legislation was
vigorously opposed by the conservative opposition in the lower house and by
the members of the upper house who represented Länder26 with conservative
governments. Having failed to prevent law reform in the democratic process,
opposition forces brought the matter before the Constitutional Court, arguing
that the state had a duty to protect the unborn and that this duty could only be
satisfied through the use of the criminal law.
This position faced three conceptual hurdles. First, there was no legal authority
at that time for the proposition that the right to human dignity or the right life
extended to the fetus.27 Second, there was no law to be challenged. Abortions
in the first trimester had been decriminalized, and abortion did not otherwise
involve the state. Since it was thought that the constitution applied only vertically,
at least with respect to the right to life, it was unclear how a constitutional challenge
could proceed.28 Third, the claimants were asking the Constitutional Court to
direct the government to recriminalize abortion. This remedy seemed to extend
beyond the Court’s functions of constitutional review and invalidation.
To the surprise of the government of the day and even the applicants,
26. Länder refers to the sub-national political units that make up the German federal state. Such
units are analogous to US states and Canadian provinces. The singular of Länder is Land.
27. Section 1 of the German Civil Code states unequivocally: “Die Rechtsfähigkeit des
Menschen beginnt mit der Vollendung der Geburt” (“The capacity of a human being to have
rights begins with the completion of birth” [translated by author, Jula Hughes]). Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch [BGB] 18 August 1896, Reichsgestzblatt [RGBl] 195 (Germany), s 1 [Civil
Code]. Note that Rechtsfähigkeit is sometimes translated as “legal capacity.” However, legal
capacity in the sense of capacity to incur obligations is defined elsewhere in the German
Civil Code as either coinciding with the age of majority, or is set out more specifically for
married minors, et cetera. In terms of constitutional law alone, the record of legislative
intent regarding Article 2(2) of the Basic Law is ambiguous at best. See Grundgesetz Für
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] 23 May 1943, BGBl. I (Germany),
art 2(2) [Basic Law]; Michael Anderheiden, Gemeinwohl in Republik und Union (Tübingen:
Mohr, 2006) at 6.
28. Mark Tushnet explains that “[a] constitution operates vertically when it regulates the relation
between a government (usually envisioned as ‘on top’) and citizens, residents, and the like.”
Tushnet, Weak Courts, supra note 15 at 196.
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the Constitutional Court overcame all three hurdles. It held that life begins at
conception or, possibly, at implantation, a decision which has had important
implications for the regulation of contraception and prenatal diagnostics but,
interestingly, not for abortion. The Court did not commit to a position on
whether the fetus was an independent rights-holder.29 Instead, it held that even
if the life that came into existence at the time of conception or implantation was
not yet a rights-holder as such, the objective normative framework of the Basic
Law required its protection.
While a great deal could be said about the Court’s characterization of the
constitution as an objective normative framework, the basic idea is that the
constitution is not merely a vehicle for conferring individual rights; it is also
expressive.30 It articulates the state’s constitutional commitments and is thus a
statement about the kind of state in which Germans live; in this case, a state committed to protecting prenatal life.31
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the historical context in which
these constitutional commitments first arose.32 The forced abortion and sterilization
campaigns of Nazi Germany played a defining role in shaping the normative core
of the Basic Law.33 This is particularly true of the right to human dignity, which
the constitutional drafters identified as the primary constitutional commitment from
which most other fundamental rights flowed.34 At the same time, the Constitutional
29. This ambiguity has given rise to lively academic debate. See Pieroth & Schlink, supra note 6
at para 136.
30. For discussion of the notion of a constitution as an objective normative framework (or,
in other translations, as an “objective order of values”), see Robert Alexy, “Constitutional
Rights, Balancing, and Rationality” (2003) 16:2 Ratio Juris 131 at 133.
31. One indication of the enduring nature of these commitments can be found in Article 79(3)
of the Basic Law, which states that the fundamental rights catalogue cannot be the subject of
amendment.
32. Lindsay K Jonker, “Learning from the Past: How the Events that Shaped the Constitutions of
the United States and Germany Play Out in the Abortion Controversy” (2010) 23:2 Regent
UL Rev 447.
33. Jeffrey C Tuomala, “Nuremberg and the Crime of Abortion” (2011) 42 U Tol L Rev 283.
34. Article 1 of the German Basic Law provides: “Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie
zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.” Its official English
translation reads: “Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of
all state authority.” Kai Möller notes:
The official English translation does not quite capture a subtle difference of language made in
the original text: In German legal terminology, there is a distinction between ‘inviolable’ (unverletzlich) and ‘untouchable’ (unantastbar), the former meaning that the state may sometimes
interfere with the object of the right, provided that it comes up with a legitimate justification,
and the latter meaning that any interference will automatically amount to a violation of the right.
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Court’s treatment of history in the First Abortion decision was selective. Although
there was some liberalization of abortion during the Weimar Republic, it was
greatly restricted under the Nazis, and physicians who provided abortions were
frequently prosecuted.35 These facts were absent from the Court’s analysis.
The application of the constitution to non-state actors had been a controversial
issue in Germany. The courts held different views on the matter, informed as much
by their respective jurisdictions as by doctrinal thinking about the constitution’s
place in the law. For example, the Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht)
had long advocated for direct application of the Basic Law to private actors, while
the Federal Court of Appeals (Bundesgerichtshof) had taken the classical liberal
position that the function of the Basic Law was to regulate the extent to which
the state could intrude into the private sphere.36 In its famous Lüth37 decision, the
Constitutional Court began to develop a theory of the indirect application of the
constitution.38 This theory recognized that the Basic Law could serve functions
that extended beyond defending the citizen against intrusions by the state.
In the First Abortion decision, the Court explained that liberal constitutional
theory was predicated on two related assumptions: that the greatest threats to
individual rights emanated from the state, and that the best way to ensure the
proper functioning of a liberal democracy was to minimize the role of government.
In Lüth and Blinkfüer,39 two cases that pre-dated the First Abortion decision, the
German Constitutional Court struggled with situations that challenged both of
these assumptions. In these earlier cases, the Court recognized that where a serious
power imbalance exists between private entities, the exercise of fundamental rights
can be significantly curtailed by private actors. If one assumes that a liberal

35.
36.
37.

38.
39.

See Kai Möller, “The Right to Life between Absolute and Proportional Protection” (LSE Law,
Society and Economy Working Paper 13/2010) at 3, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1620377>.
Fridolf Kudlien, “The German response to the birth rate problem during the Third Reich”
(1990) 5:3 Continuity & Change 225 at 229.
Pieroth & Schlink, supra note 6 at paras 189-200.
Lüth, (1958) 7 BverfGE 198 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany). An English translation is available
online. See Institute for Transnational Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law,
Foreign Translations, (December 2005), online: <http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/
centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=13 69>.
For a discussion of the distinction between the “direct” and “indirect” application of the
constitution, see Stephen Gardbaum, “Where the (State) Action Is” (2006) 4:4 Int’l J Const
L 760.
Blinkfüer, (1969) 25 BverfGE 256 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany). A partial English translation
is available online. See Institute for Transnational Law, University of Texas at Austin School
of Law, Foreign Translations, (December 2005), online: <http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/
centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=650>.
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democracy functions best when the individual’s ability to exercise her fundamental
rights is maximized, it is possible to conclude that the state should play a role in
addressing power imbalances, levelling the playing field, and enabling participation
in the marketplace of ideas.
Drawing upon this notion in the First Abortion decision, the majority
identified a power imbalance between the fetus and the pregnant woman. In
order to give effect to the fetus’s rights to human dignity and to life, it would be
necessary to bring the law to bear on the actions of both the pregnant woman
(characterized, significantly, as the “mother” or “becoming mother” throughout
the majority’s decision) and her physician. Since the legislature had opted to cease
using the general law for this purpose, the constitution would have to be invoked
to fill the gap. In this context, the Basic Law was fulfilling a secondary function, that
of protecting a weaker party from the actions of a stronger party. This function
was necessary where the exercise of the constitutional right would be impossible
without state intervention (chancenloses Grundrecht). As in Lüth, this did not
mean that the fundamental rights of the other party (here, the pregnant woman)
were irrelevant. Classical liberal theory sufficed, however, to explain how these
rights were affected and how they should be reconciled with the newly identified
protective duties emanating from the Basic Law.
Having overcome the first two doctrinal hurdles, the Constitutional Court
was poised to take the third. It determined that the criminal law was the only
effective mechanism for signaling society’s disapprobation of abortion and
preventing, to the greatest extent possible, its occurrence.
Two justices dissented in the First Abortion decision, and the gap between
the North American and German approaches appears much narrower when we
consider their reasons for judgment. The starting point for the dissenting judges
was the principle of judicial self-restraint, which they described as the lifeblood
of constitutional jurisprudence.40 They emphasized that the constitution
was predominantly, though not exclusively, defensive in nature and cautioned
against a more than incremental expansion of the non-defensive aspects of the
constitution. They urged their colleagues to consider the impact on defensive
rights that might result from the recognition of protective constitutional duties.
This did not lead the dissenters to reject the protective function outright,
however. They agreed that the courts have a legitimate role to play in enforcing
the protective function, particularly where the state has conferred a benefit (for
example, social assistance) that related to a constitutional interest, such as the
interest in security of the person. However, as the dissenters noted, the Court’s
40. First Abortion decision, supra note 1 at para 69.
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jurisprudence on this point was in its early stages:
Of course, given the increasing importance of social benefit laws for the realization
of constitutional rights, we cannot deny the need for constitutional review in this
area; the development of a suitable analytical framework which respects the legislative freedom to design programs may well be one of the chief tasks of jurisprudential
development over the next few years.41

The dissenters were concerned that in the absence of a developed jurisprudence
on the limits of constitutional review in protective function cases, the Court
might exceed the appropriate scope of judicial review.42 They argued that the
legislature was owed deference and that the proper role of the Court was usually
to identify defects in legislative schemes rather than to cure them.43
The dissenters accepted, as did all parties before the Court, that the constitution
protected fetal life.44 The right to life and the right to human dignity would be engaged, for example, if the state sought to interfere with a woman’s pregnancy through
forced abortion. In that scenario, the constitutional protection of unborn life would
be as far-reaching as for a born human being:
In so far as the defence against state intrusion is concerned, we may of course not
distinguish between prenatal and postnatal developmental stages; the embryo is thus
to be protected as a potential constitutional rights holder in the same way as any
born human life.45

However, the same analysis could not be applied without further thought where the
indirect application of the constitution was being contemplated. In that case, additional considerations about the appropriate scope of the constitution became relevant.46
Additional considerations were indeed present when the interference with
pregnancy was based upon “the woman’s refusal to permit the fetal development to
41. Ibid at para 72.
42. Ibid.
43. The discussion on this point is reminiscent of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Schachter v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679, 93 DLR (4th) 1.
44. We should not rush to dismiss this as irreconcilable with Canadian law without further
analysis. In 1997, two judges of the Supreme Court of Canada were prepared to support the
proposition that the state could validly pursue such an interest and that the parens patriae
jurisdiction of the courts could be invoked in support of this pursuit. See Winnipeg Child and
Family Services (Northwest Area) v G (DF), [1997] 3 SCR 925, 152 DLR (4th) 165, Major
J. Even the majority suggests that it may well be open to legislatures to enact laws for this
purpose as long as they appropriately balance the rights interests involved and ensure that any
measure minimally impairs the liberty of pregnant women.
45. First Abortion decision, supra note 1 at para 79.
46. Ibid.
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continue in her own body.”47 In analyzing the abortion context, the dissenting
judges rejected the majority’s analogy to homicide. They concluded that the law
applicable to homicide, including a possible constitutional directive requiring its
criminalization, could never be applied to abortion. The dissenters reached this
conclusion for two reasons. First, the legal demand not to have an abortion is
unlike the demand not to kill another person. While the latter requires an individual to refrain from certain activity, the former requires the woman to accept
fundamental intrusions into her well-being and life planning. Second, the legal
objective of protecting human life is best achieved by supporting the woman,
who is the primary protector of fetal life. The legislator was therefore entitled to
take note of these legal differences, and it was not appropriate for the Court to
treat homicide and abortion alike.
Thus, the issue for the dissenting judges was not whether the state had
the duty to protect the fetus, but whether the Basic Law required abortion to
be criminalized. The dissent’s answer to this question was an emphatic “no.”
Criminalization was a measure of last resort that had to be shown to be both
effective and necessary. The record showed that the criminal law was ineffective
at preventing abortions.48 It was also unnecessary in a constitutional sense. For
a protective criminal measure to be constitutionally required, suitable measures
of a more moderate kind would have to be either unavailable or demonstrably
ineffective. This had not been demonstrated.
B. Reaction and Response

The First Abortion decision was widely criticized. It was denounced by women’s
rights groups as well as by anti-choice groups, who would have preferred no
recognition of women’s rights at all.49 Jurists of all stripes were equally unhappy.
Progressives decried the fabrication of constitutional principles and the overextension
47. Ibid.
48. Specifically, the dissenters highlighted minimal prosecutions and an even lower conviction
rate despite a high incidence of illegal abortions. See First Abortion decision, supra note 1
at para 82. For Canadians, this may seem to be a weaker argument than it is in the German
context since in that country prosecution of most offences is not considered discretionary,
but is instead mandatory once the relevant authorities become aware of the offence (leading
to a duty to investigate) and a subsequent investigation leads to a viable case (duty to
prosecute). See Uwe Hellmann, Strafprozessrecht, (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2006) at para
51. On the absence of a duty to investigate and prosecute in Canada, see Hill v HamiltonWentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, [2007] 3 SCR 129 at para 54; R v
Nixon, 2011 SCC 34, [2011] 2 SCR 566 at para 21.
49. Eser, supra note 12 at 380-83.
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of the criminal law,50 while conservatives expressed dismay at the decision’s doctrinal
inconsistencies and the Court’s rejection of classical liberal constitutional theory.
The authors of the (conservative) constitutional commentary Maunz Dürig were
particularly critical of the Court’s “patchwork quilt” approach to constitutional
rights, which, they argued, resulted in the Court drawing upon aspects of multiple
rights guarantees to support its reasoning:
[T]he Constitutional Court gains its normative base for the state’s protection of
unborn life against abortion, apodictically, from the protection of human dignity
(Art. 1 of the Basic Law), but determines the required scope of the protection,
equally apodictically, from Art. 2 (Right to Life). This jurisprudence sacrifices coherent constitutional doctrine on the altar of result-driven smoothness (likely the price
of finding an internal Constitutional Court compromise).51

Commentators also took issue with the majority’s reliance on the concept of
human dignity. Based upon the existing jurisprudence, it was not obvious how
dignitary rights were engaged absent cruelty or discriminatory motives:
At first blush, it remains unclear why abortion would even affect the dignitary interest. The incursion into life as the “vital base of human dignity” can in itself not
found the violation of human dignity - assuming that not all killing affects human
dignity. In so far as human dignity is violated, the required degree of respect and
protection can only be determined under Art. 1 (inter alia, because of the direct
horizontal application of the inviolateness formula in Art. 1). Human dignity is not
affected by an abortion sought for the simple reason of a rejection of the pregnancy
as unwanted. Only when special circumstances are added could abortion affect the
human dignity of the foetus. These might include the selection of the foetus on the
basis of sex or for eugenic reasons, or because the abortion is carried out to use the
aborted foetus for research purposes.52

The commentators emphasized here that the concepts of human life and human
dignity ought not to be considered co-extensive. Not all interventions that affect
or even destroy human life violate human dignity. By drawing on both concepts
without articulating their relationship, the Court generated considerable confusion about the scope of constitutional protection accorded to the fetus.53
50. Pieroth & Schlink, supra note 6 at para 436.
51. Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 8th ed, vol 1, looseleaf (last
updated 1 May 2009), (Munich: Beck, 2006) at para 68 [translated by author, Jula Hughes].
52. Ibid at para 69.
53. A somewhat analogous issue emerges from the various opinions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519, 107 DLR
(4th) 342 [Rodriguez]. In Rodriguez, the majority perceives the sanctity of life and the dignity
of the individual to be in conflict, while for Justice Cory, the right to life includes the right to
a dignified life.
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Beginning in 1975 and continuing until 1989, abortion was generally
criminalized in West Germany subject to a series of legislative exemptions.
In response to the First Abortion decision, the federal parliament enacted a legislative
scheme that reconciled the fetal interest in life with the fundamental rights of women
with unintended pregnancies. The scheme secured basic abortion access and treated
abortions differently depending on the reasons or “indications” for which they
were sought (Indikationenlösung).54 The reasons for seeking an abortion were
grouped into four categories: medical, where the health or life of the woman
(“mother”) was in danger; eugenic or embryopathic, where a prenatal diagnosis
of a significant defect in the fetus was made; social, where the woman faced significant social obstacles in carrying the pregnancy to term because of such factors
as her age, income level, or family situation; and criminological, where the
pregnancy was the result of rape. Abortions for medical and embryopathic reasons
were permitted in the first trimester and sometimes later, whereas abortions for social
and criminological reasons were subject to a first trimester exemption only. In
all cases, women were required to receive counselling, the nature of which depended
on the reason for seeking the abortion.55 A liberal interpretation of social reasons in
some parts of the country led to a considerable amount of abortion tourism from
areas governed by Christian conservative parties. Generally, access to abortion was
good, at least in the first trimester, though mandatory counselling and administrative
restrictions at the Land level continued to draw criticism from pro-choice groups.56
C. The Second Abortion Decision

In 1989, a new problem arose in the context of German reunification. Abortion
had been legal in the first trimester in East Germany since 1972. As a socialist
and atheist state, East Germany attached no legal consequences to having an
abortion.57 After reunification, the pre-existing East and West Germany abortion
54. For a discussion of the indications model, see Eser, supra note 12. Eser provides an extensive
discussion, predominantly from an anti-choice perspective.
55. The German Constitutional Court described the legislative scheme enacted following the First
Abortion decision in the Second Abortion decision. See Second Abortion decision, supra note 2
at paras 2-30. See also Donald P Kommers, “The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany:
Should Americans Pay Attention?” (1994) 10:1 J Contemp Health L & Pol’y 1 at 7-8.
56. Lynn Kamenista, “Abortion Debates in Germany” in Dorothy McBride Stetson, ed, Abortion
Politics, Women’s Movements, and the Democratic State: A Comparative Study of State Feminism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 111 at 118.
57. For a discussion of the regulation of abortion in East Germany, see Michael Schwartz,
“Emanzipation zur sozialen Nützlichkeit: Bedingungen und Grenzen von Frauenpolitik
in der DDR” in Dierk Hoffmann, ed, Sozialstaatlichkeit in der DDR: Sozialpolitische
Entwicklungen im Spannungsfeld von Diktatur und Gesellschaft 1945/49-1989 (Munich:
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practices continued on an interim basis in their respective territories, but it was
clear that this state of affairs could not continue, particularly since the First Abortion decision suggested that criminalization was constitutionally mandated and
the Basic Law now applied to the former East German territory.58
Politicians reached a compromise that once again legalized abortion in the
first trimester, albeit with mandatory counselling. The German Constitutional
Court suspended the new law while it took it under review. In the Second
Abortion decision, the Court affirmed the proposition that life begins at conception.
It also upheld the protective function as a secondary constitutional function. In a
departure from the First Abortion decision, however, it found (somewhat convolutedly) that criminalization was not required in early pregnancy. The majority
went on to prescribe a complex regulatory regime to govern abortion, which
included directions on the issue of the status of abortions as insured services.
The Court began the Second Abortion decision by characterizing the holding
in the First Abortion decision in the following manner:
[The] First Senate of the Court declared that § 218a of the Penal Code [the abortion
decriminalization provision] … is inconsistent with Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence
1 in conjunction with Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law and is invalid, inasmuch as it exempts pregnancy termination from punishment even if there are no
grounds that - in the sense of the grounds for the Judgment - are of lasting duration
in the face of the order of values of the Basic Law.59

By this technical introduction, the Court distanced itself from its earlier decision,
perhaps signalling its awareness of the academic criticism that had followed the
First Abortion decision, particularly in relation to the Court drawing on a patchwork of rights. The Court also recast the constitutional holding in terms more
consistent with defensive rights by characterizing the operative provision as an
exemption from criminalization. Arguably, limiting an exemption is more consistent
with defensive rights than forcing the state to criminalize conduct. Again, this
seemed responsive to the prior critiques, suggesting that the Court might be
prepared to take a more balanced approach between defensive rights and the
Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005) 47.
58. For a more detailed account of this aspect of German reunification, see Michael G Mattern,
“German Abortion Law: The Unwanted Child of Reunification” (1991) 13:3 Loy LA Int’l
& Comp LJ 643; Rosemarie Will, “German Unification and the Reform of Abortion Law”
(1996) 3:2 Cardozo Women’s LJ 399; and Karen Y Crabbs, “The German Abortion Debate:
Stumbling Block To Unity” (1991) 6:2 Fla J Int’l L 213.
59. Second Abortion decision, supra note 2 at para 2. The Second Abortion decision was
rendered by the Second Senate of the Court. The emphasis on the prior case having been
decided by the “other” Senate signals some distance from that earlier decision.
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protective function. Finally, the Court’s description of the First Abortion decision
implied some doubt as to the validity of the remedial component of the previous
decision. It will be recalled that in the First Abortion decision, the Court had not merely
declared the reform legislation invalid; it had required Parliament to recriminalize
abortion except in limited circumstances. In the Second Abortion decision, this
rather dramatic holding was reframed as a limited declaration of invalidity.
Very early in its reasons for judgment, however, the Court renewed its commitment
to the protective function. It noted that:
The Basic Law requires the state to protect human life. Human life includes the life
of the unborn. It too is entitled to the protection of the state. The Basic Law does
more than just prohibit direct interference by the state in the life of the unborn, it
enjoins it to protect and support such life, i.e. above all to guard it against illegal
interference by third parties … . The obligation to protect is based on Article 1,
Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, which expressly requires the state to respect and
protect human dignity; its object, and following from that, its extent are more precisely
defined in Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law.60

The Court’s tone in the Second Abortion decision is distinctly milder, however.
The Court recognized that the “obligation to protect life is not so absolute that it
even takes priority, without exception, over every other legal value”61 (Rechtsgüter).
Accordingly, any decision in this area would require the courts to balance or, more
precisely, to “reconcile”62 the fetus’s right to life and the woman’s rights to life,
physical integrity, personal autonomy, and to the protection and recognition of
60. Ibid at para 145 [emphasis in original] [citation omitted].
61. Ibid at para 153. The official English translation likely does not convey the doctrinal gravity
of this statement. Rechtsgüter are a subset of social values that are legally cognizable, only
some of which sound in constitutional law. See Mutzenbacher, (1990) 83 BVerfGE 130 (Fed
Const Ct) (Germany) [translated by author, Jula Hughes].
62. Konrad Hesse, former judge of the Constitutional Court and professor of constitutional law,
captured Parliament’s complex task (reviewable by the courts) in reconciling competing rights
and interests as follows:
The function of constitutional rights limits is to reconcile these freedoms into a coherent
framework of social conditions. Further, they should reconcile these rights with those other
social circumstances that are important for the life of the community and which are (or should
be) legally protected. This reconciliation of civil liberties and other legally cognizable values
is only minimally directed by the constitution itself ... The task of practical reconciliation
requires the proportionate concordance of fundamental rights and rights-limiting legal
values; ... both have to be brought to optimal effectiveness. ... It must be proportionate in the
narrower sense, i.e. there must be a proportionate relationship between the weight and importance of the constitutional right.

Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 20th ed
(Heidelberg: CF Müller, 1999) at paras 317-18 [translated by author, Jula Hughes].
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her dignity. Two related issues thus arose: What is the range of options available
to the state in reconciling these rights and interests and what is the appropriate
standard of review of its decision?
On the first issue, the Court explained that the defensive rights engaged by
the law impose an upper limit on the degree of intrusion into the individual’s
sphere of liberty that the state could justify. This upper limit is determined by the
obligation to give effect to competing constitutional rights and by the requirements of proportionality. Thus, a rule privileging the fetus’s right to life without
any recognition of the countervailing rights of the pregnant woman could not
pass constitutional muster.
Unlike in the Canadian context, the German Constitutional Court also
recognized a lower limit, one imposed by the state’s protective function. Where
the protective function is engaged, the state is required to meet a minimum
standard of protection (Untermaßverbot). Thus, a legislative rule that left the
fetus’s right to life exposed to the sole discretion of the woman could not
withstand constitutional scrutiny. These upper and lower limits would have to
be reconciled. In rights reconciliation, both the defensive rights engaged and
the constitutional interests protected are diminished to some degree. Proportionality
in this context means that the degree of diminution is determined by first attributing
a particular weight to each right and interest and then balancing them in accordance
with their relative weight.63
On the second issue, a majority of the German Constitutional Court held that
the burden is on the state to assess how best to fulfill its protective function. This
assessment could be reviewed on three grounds: the effectiveness of the measure
selected, the soundness of the state’s factual assumptions, and the reasonableness
of the inferences drawn from those factual assumptions. As the Court explained:
It is the legislature’s task to determine the nature and extent of protection. The Basic
Law identifies protection as a goal, but does not define the form it should take in
detail. Nevertheless, the legislature must take into account the prohibition on too
little protection ... so that, to this extent, it is subject to constitutional control. What
is necessary - taking into account conflicting legal values - is appropriate protection,
but what is essential is that such protection is effective. The measures taken by the
legislature must be sufficient to ensure appropriate and effective protection and be
based on a careful analysis of facts and tenable assessment.64

63.

For a discussion of this concept of “weighing,” see Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional
Rights, translated by Julian Rivers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) [Alexy, Theory].

64. Second Abortion decision, supra note 2 at para 154 [emphasis in original].
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Later in the opinion, the Court elaborated that
The legislature has scope to assess, weigh up and create even where, as is here the case,
the constitution binds it to undertake effective and adequate measures to protect a
legal value. How its scope is limited depends on various types of factors, in particular,
on the characteristics of the relevant area, on the possibility of accurately predicting
future developments - such as the effects a rule will have - and on the significance of
the legal values at stake … Constitutional examination [judicial review] extends in any
case to checking whether the legislature has sufficiently taken the named factors into
account and used its scope for assessment in a “justifiable manner.”65

Thus, the state is required to base its legal response on “careful” factual determinations
and “justifiable” value judgments.
Ultimately, the majority concluded that the state was not constitutionally
obligated to criminalize abortion in the first trimester so long as it established a
mandatory counselling regime. This counselling would be aimed at encouraging
the woman to continue her pregnancy and to make her aware of any supports
available to her if she carried the pregnancy to term. Abortions carried out
following counselling but in the absence of third-party determination of a constitutionally valid reason could not be covered by medicare (essentially perpetuating
the West German “Indikationenlösung” or “indications” model mentioned earlier),
but could be covered by social assistance in cases of financial need.
There are some passages in the Second Abortion decision in which the
Court seems to renew its commitment to a punitive approach to abortions. As
a number of commentators have pointed out, however, this is little more than
rhetoric. Horst Dreier explains:
Much more important and ultimately decisive is that the Constitutional Court itself
does not sustain the criminalization requirement and even undermines it to such
a degree that there is nothing left in the end. To put it bluntly: the rhetoric of the
fundamental illegality of abortion is false advertisement.66

More interesting for our purposes is that the Court recognized that in order
for the state to protect fetal life effectively, the legal regime governing abortion
must be responsive to the reasons why women seek abortions. The Court noted
that “an unfavorable housing situation, the impossibility of looking after a child
parallel to vocational training or working, economic hardship and other material
reasons, and in the case of single women, fear of discrimination by the community”

65. Ibid at para 176 [citations omitted].
66. Horst Dreier, “Grenzen des Tötungsverbotes – Teil 1” (2007) 62 Juristen Zeitung 261 at 268
[translated by author, Jula Hughes].
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were all frequently cited reasons for seeking an abortion.67 Therefore, whatever
the state’s obligation to criminalize, it also has an obligation to create conditions
that make it easier for women to carry pregnancies to term. This includes targeted
measures to assist women with housing, education, or childcare, as well as systemic
measures to create a more “child-friendly society.”68
Moreover, the state’s obligation is not limited to measures that it could take
of its own accord; it is required to go further and engage society in the pursuit of
these goals. This translates into a far-reaching, affirmative obligation to regulate
in support of women and children:
[The] state is bound to promote a child-friendly society which in turn also has repercussions for unborn life. The legislature must bear this in mind when making
rules, not just in the area of labor law, but also in other private law areas. Thus there
are provisions prohibiting the termination of a lease because of the birth of a child
as well as provisions regarding consumer loans, their wording and government contract assistance which make it possible or easier for parents to meet their financial
obligations following the birth of a child.69

Finally, as the Court explained, the state also bears an obligation to measure
whether the law is effective. For this reason, the state is required to gather data on
abortions and monitor the actual effects of the legislation on an ongoing basis.70
Once again, there was a vigorous dissent, this time by two male judges.71 As in
the First Abortion decision, the dissenters neither doubted that life began at conception nor that protection is a constitutional function. Rather, the dissenters disagreed
with the majority about the scope of women’s defensive rights, arguing that it should
be expanded. The dissenters framed the issue in the following manner:
The legal regulation of pregnancy termination grips the innermost area of human
life and affects central questions of human existence. One of the fundamental conditions of human life is that sexuality and the desire for children do not correspond.
Women have to bear the consequences of this divergence. At all times, and in all
cultures, irrespective of differences in moral and religious values, they have looked
for and found ways out of the predicament of an unwanted pregnancy.72

The dissenters were of the view that the proposed law evinced an appropriate shift
in the understanding of women’s equality rights:
67. Second Abortion decision, supra note 2 at para 167.
68. Ibid at para 170.
69. Ibid. We use the term “child-friendly” throughout the article. We also use the terms “womanfriendly” and “pregnancy-friendly” to refer to policies analogous to those described in this passage.
70. Ibid at para 299.
71. In the First Abortion decision, one man and one woman dissented.
72. Second Abortion decision, supra note 2 at para 373.
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[The] counseling regulation is not a frustrated escape from the frustrating failure
of the indication solution [i.e. the law adopted in response to the First Abortion
decision based on statutory reasons or “indications” for seeking an abortion]. The
new regulation is much more the result of an altered understanding of the personality and dignity of the woman. The Judgment’s finding that a woman is capable of
a responsible choice regarding the continuation or interruption of her pregnancy
must, however, have consequences for the interpretation of the constitution. In our
opinion, it forces us to solve the collision between the human dignity of the unborn
on the one hand, and the dignity of the pregnant woman on the other, by achieving
a balance between the two.73

According to the dissenting judges, the legislative solution under review struck
an appropriate balance between the interests of the fetus and the rights of the
woman because it was closely tied to the developmental stages of pregnancy.
Early in the pregnancy, the woman’s rights were clearly predominant, and the
state complied with its protective obligation through mandatory counselling.74
Later in the pregnancy, the interests of the fetus became more important, to the
point where, at the end of the pregnancy, the state became the ultimate arbiter
of whether a pregnancy could be terminated and whether the woman’s right to
choose could be subject to review.75
A separate, partial dissent by Justice Böckenförde squarely addressed the
issue of reconciliation. He stated that reconciliation “requires compromises,
which may appear painful when compared to a complete regulatory concept,
but which are nonetheless unavoidable. In this sense the counseling concept has
its ‘costs’.”76 It was the refusal to accept these costs that, in his view, rendered
the majority decision precarious. It was not analytically helpful first to accept the
diminution of the state’s protective obligations vis-à-vis the fetus to give appropriate
effect to the defensive rights of the woman and then to seek to recover the costs of the
compromise at a later stage of the analysis. In Justice Böckenförde’s view, the majority’s attempt to enlarge the protection afforded to the fetus by seeking to exclude
abortion services from insured medical services, only to find that the constitution
required that abortion be covered for many women for poverty law reasons, was
the kind of constitutional flip-flop that rendered the majority opinion dubious.
At the end of the day, all three opinions agreed that the constitution imposes
73.
74.
75.
76.

Ibid at para 380.
Ibid at para 386.
Ibid at para 387.
Ibid at para 433.
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protective obligations and that life begins at conception. The justices disagreed on
what is constitutionally required to defend the rights of women, what is required
for the state to comply with its protective obligations, what degree of deference
should be paid to the state’s mode of regulation, and how competing rights and
interests should be reconciled. This demonstrates that accepting that the state
has protective obligations does not necessarily determine judicial outcomes.
Similarly, recognizing that the fetus has a constitutional interest in life that must be
protected by the state does not determine the weight assigned to this interest when it
is reconciled with a woman’s rights to self-determination, privacy, autonomy, physical
integrity, and equality.
In the decades since 1975, the German Constitutional Court has applied
the protective function very sparingly, despite frequent invitations to apply it
by constitutional complainants.77 Thus, the jurisprudential development of the
protective function continues to be somewhat stunted. In denying its application,
however, the Court has articulated some of its limits, particularly insofar as it relates
to the deference owed to legislative choice.
In the First Abortion decision, deference was not an issue because the Constitutional Court was persuaded that only one form of law—the criminal law—was
adequate to the task of protecting fetal life. This view came under attack in the
Second Abortion decision for both empirical and doctrinal reasons. The Court
held in the Second Abortion decision that deference was owed to the legislature
when it designed legislation expecting that it would have a certain effect. At the
time of enactment, the legislature was required to make a reasoned guess as to the
likely effects of the law, but since neither the courts nor the legislature could know
the future, there could be no obligation to be correct. However, once the law had
been in place for some time, it could no longer be said that the effects of the law
were unknowable, and the rationale for deference was correspondingly diminished.
In the period between the First and Second Abortion decisions, the rate of
abortion in West Germany was consistent with that of other Western democracies. Some countries with much more liberal abortion laws had lower rates of
abortion, while other countries with even stricter rules saw higher rates. The rate
fluctuated in response to demographic and economic factors, but not in response
to criminalization. Similarly, public attitudes about abortion had proven remarkably unresponsive to the legal framework.78 For this reason, it was impossible to
77. These cases came before the German Constitutional Court by way of constitutional
complaint. See Pieroth & Schlink, supra note 6 at paras 110-17.
78. Stanley K Henshaw, Susheela Singh & Taylor Haas, “Recent Trends in Abortion Rates
Worldwide” (1999) 25:1 Int’l Fam Planning Perspectives 44.
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establish an empirical basis for the claim that criminal prohibition was either
adequate or necessary to protect prenatal life.
In the Second Abortion decision, the German Constitutional Court also
committed to regulatory deference. While the Court might recognize a protective
obligation in certain circumstances, the choice of how to effect that protection
was left to the state. It was therefore open to the legislature to prefer a mode
of regulation grounded in encouragement and public education rather than
criminal sanction. Consistent with both the empirical evidence and the principle
of regulatory deference, then, the Constitutional Court resiled from requiring
criminalization in the Second Abortion decision. Nevertheless, it directed a very
detailed regime to govern mandatory counselling.
In its journey from the First to the Second Abortion decision, the German
Constitutional Court covered considerable doctrinal and policy ground. The
judges struggled to articulate a constitutional theory that reconciled the rights of
the pregnant woman and the interests of the fetus and held the state accountable
not only for intrusions into the defensive rights of individuals but also for failures
to protect constitutional interests. Neither the Court not the parties doubted that
the state had an obligation to protect fetal life, though they disagreed about the
appropriate way to implement this obligation.

II. A Canadian Protective Function?
Four mediating ideas appearing in the First and Second Abortion decisions
facilitate comparison with concepts in Canadian constitutional law. They are
judicial restraint, deference, the regulatory competence of the legislature, and
a commitment to the rule of law and a liberal and democratic society. The
presence of these concepts in Canadian constitutional law suggests that the
core constitutional commitments of the German and Canadian jurisdictions
are sufficiently similar to permit meaningful comparison.
In the First Abortion decision, the dissent framed its discussion of the
protective function in terms of the principles of judicial restraint and deference.
It emphasized that the state was competent to develop a regulatory scheme that
satisfied its protective obligations. A majority of the Constitutional Court took
a similar view in the Second Abortion decision. The Supreme Court of Canada
has also emphasized the importance of deference, particularly “[w]here a complex
regulatory response to a social problem” is involved.79 In both the German and
79. Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 SCR 567 [Hutterian
Brethren]. See also Irwin Toy v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at para 79, 55

MacDonnell & Hughes, german abortion decisions 1023

the Canadian contexts, these issues play out against the backdrop of a broader
commitment to the rule of law and to a liberal and democratic society.80
We suggest that the German decisions present a way of conceptualizing the
state’s protective obligations that could usefully be applied in the context of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. At this stage of the analysis, our focus is
on the concept of the protective function generally. In Part III, below, we suggest
how the specific constitutional issues raised by abortion could be better understood
by reading the German and Canadian abortion decisions synthetically.
The Supreme Court of Canada has generally taken a dim view of the idea
that the state might have an affirmative obligation to protect individuals from
“threats”81 to their constitutional interests emanating from private sources.82 Occasionally, it has found ways of giving effect to protective claims, most often
by re-characterizing such claims in terms of negative rights and using standard
Charter analysis to resolve them, or by identifying them as the “pressing and substantial” objective that justifies a deprivation of Charter rights under section 1.83
As a general rule, however, the Supreme Court’s point of departure has been the
classical liberal view that “the Charter does not oblige the state to take affirmative
DLR (4th) 577 [Irwin Toy].
80. See e.g. the text of section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides
that the Charter “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society.” For discussion of the rule of law dimension of section 1, see James McConnell,
“Administrative Discretion and Section 1 of the Charter: Proportionality, Reasons and the
Rule of Law” (2011) (unpublished, copy on file with the author); Joel Bakan et al, Canadian
Constitutional Law, 4th ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2010) at 766-67; R v Therens,
[1985] 1 SCR 613, 18 DLR (4th) 655.
81. Dieter Grimm, “The Protective Function of the State,” in Georg Nolte, ed, European and
US Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 137 at 145 [Grimm,
“Protective Function”]. We will use this term throughout.
82. See e.g. Delisle v Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 SCR 989, 176 DLR (4th) 513.
But see Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser]; Health
Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27,
[2007] 2 SCR 391 [BC Health Services]; Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC
94, [2001] 3 SCR 1016 [Dunmore]; Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th)
385 [Vriend]; Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR
(4th) 577. See generally MacDonnell, “Protective Function,” supra note 4.
83. See e.g. Irwin Toy, supra note 79; R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 713, 35 DLR
(4th) 1 [Edwards Books cited to SCR]; Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services
Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134 [Insite]; Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC
3, [2010] 1 SCR 44 [Khadr SCC]. See also Choudhry, “Legacy of Oakes,” supra note 15 at 514;
Tushnet, Weak Courts, supra note 15 at 203-07.
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action to safeguard or facilitate the exercise of fundamental freedoms.”84
Conceptualizing the constitution as an objective normative framework undermines this view of the state’s obligations. As we have explained, the German protective
function is rooted in the idea that rights “are expressions of objective values.”85 The
Supreme Court of Canada explicitly affirmed this conceptualization of the Charter
in RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd,86 when it concluded that “the judiciary ought to
apply and develop the principles of the common law in a manner consistent with the
fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution.”87 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court acknowledged the broader influence of the Charter’s normative value
statement and appeared to be saying that the Charter’s function was more than
merely defensive. It is significant that these very ideas, which were articulated by the
German Constitutional Court in Lüth, provided the conceptual foundation for the
recognition of the protective function in the First Abortion decision.
Governments in Canada regularly enact laws intended to secure interests of
a constitutional character. In a state with constitutional commitments of the kind
enshrined in the Charter, it might be argued that this function derives from the
constitution itself.88 In other words, it might be argued that the state is constitutionally
obligated to identify threats to Charter-protected interests posed by private actors and
to address those threats in some way, whether by criminal prohibition, regulation, or
administrative action. This is a key insight that emerges from the German Abortion
decisions: In addition to the state’s duty not to infringe constitutional rights, the
constitution may also impose duties of protection on the state.89
The German example also tells us something useful about both the utility
and the limits of a normative or values-based extension of the constitution. On
the one hand, the German example allows us to see that many of the interests
typically considered under the “pressing and substantial” branch of the Oakes test
have constitutional weight and status. On the other hand, in the First Abortion
Decision, the normative framework was forced to bear more weight than it could
reasonably support, not because the constitution should not or cannot be under84. Dunmore, supra note 82 at para 19. Interestingly, the Court does not appear to decide
Dunmore in a manner consistent with this decree. For other exceptions, see Fraser, supra note
82; BC Health Services, supra note 82.
85. Grimm, “Protective Function,” supra note 81 at 144.
86. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 [RWDSU] v Dolphin Delivery Ltd,
[1986] 2 SCR 573, 33 DLR (4th) 174 [Dolphin Delivery].
87. Ibid at para 39.
88. See Frank I Michelman, “The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification”
(2003) 1:1 Int’l J Const L 13 [Michelman, “Liberal Political Justification”].
89. Grimm, “Protective Function,” supra note 81 at 137.
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stood as a normative framework, but because serious difficulties in application
arise when the normative framework is forced to operate as a placeholder for a full
constitutional rights-holder. Rather than weighing the pregnant woman’s rights
to autonomy, physical and psychological integrity, privacy, equality, and dignity
against the rights of another constitutional rights-holder, the Court weighed
them against the full abstract identity of the state. This seriously distorted the
analysis. The Court effectively asked whether the rights of an individual could
outweigh the interest of the German people in living in a modern democracy that
had successfully emerged from the shadows of fascism. On this biased scale, the
woman’s rights were found to be too light.
This brings us to a second idea that emerges from the German abortion
decisions that is relevant to a discussion of the protective function in Canada.
Where the protection of one Charter interest would infringe other Charter rights,
the state is required to reconcile the rights and interests engaged. The product
of this process of reconciliation (whether a law, a regulatory scheme, or an
administrative decision) is subject to judicial review, but it is the state, in the
first instance, that must decide how best to reconcile the conflicting rights
and interests.90 In the context of abortion, for example, the German Parliament had sought to balance the interests of the pregnant woman and those
of the fetus both in 1974 and in 1989 by decriminalizing abortion in the
early stages of pregnancy. Although the ultimate issue in the First and Second
Abortion decisions was whether the state had satisfied its duty to protect the
fetus, the judgments fully considered the competing constitutional rights and
interests engaged by the act of decriminalization.
The German Court’s evolving treatment of the concept of deference is also
instructive. The majority’s conclusion in the First Abortion decision that the state
must use the criminal law to regulate abortion has been criticized on the ground
that the Court did not defer adequately to the state’s regulatory choice.91 By
contrast, the dissenters’ reasons took the concept of deference much more
seriously. In the Second Abortion decision, the Court moved to curtail the
sweeping nature of its earlier pronouncement. It concluded that deference
was warranted in reviewing the effectiveness of the legislative measure, the
soundness of the legislature’s factual assumptions, and the reasonableness of
the inferences it drew from those factual assumptions.
Similar modes of reasoning are visible in Charter jurisprudence and scholar90. Ibid at 140, 149-50.
91. Ibid at 150.
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ship.92 In this Part, we consider how reading the Charter case law with an eye to
the protective function helps bring added clarity to the jurisprudence. We begin
with two early Charter cases, Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General)93 and R v
Edwards Books and Art Ltd.94 In Irwin Toy, the Supreme Court heard a challenge
to provisions of Quebec’s consumer protection law that prohibited commercial
advertising aimed at children under thirteen. Irwin Toy argued that the provisions
violated its right to commercial expression as protected by section 2(b) of the Charter.
The Court concluded that the law infringed freedom of expression, but a majority
went on to hold that the infringement was justified.
Irwin Toy was a challenge to government decision making that had occurred
in a policy space populated with competing constitutional rights and interests.
The consumer protection scheme banning commercial advertising aimed at children engaged the right to freedom of expression of manufacturers of children’s
goods. Interests of a constitutional dimension were arguably also engaged by
manufacturers’ attempts to capitalize on children’s “vulnerab[ility]”95 in order to
sell merchandise. Indeed, at the section 1 stage, the Court identified as a pressing
and substantial objective “the protection of a group which is particularly vulnerable to the techniques of seduction and manipulation abundant in advertising.”96
In addition to harming children, the Court explained, such advertising might
also have negative “secondary effects” on families.97 Thus, the Court recognized as
justified the legislature’s efforts to advance the interests of children. In light of the
German jurisprudence, we could recast Irwin Toy as a constitutional challenge to
a legislative scheme enacted in satisfaction of the state’s constitutional obligation
of protection. The scheme, it might be said, advanced children’s constitutional
interests in equality, freedom of thought and belief, and liberty and security of
the person. Note that since children, unlike fetuses, are full rights-holders,
the normative framework does not serve as an abstract set of constitutionally
protected interests. It merely helps us to recognize the constitutional nature of
the interests that underlie the regulation of advertising aimed at children.98
92. See e.g. Oakes, supra note 15 at paras 64-66; Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, “The Supreme
Court and Section One of the Charter” (1988) 10 Sup Ct L Rev 469 [Weinrib, “Section
One”]; Lorraine Weinrib, “‘Limitations on Rights’ in a Constitutional Democracy: Models of
Judicial Review under Canada’s Charter” (1996) 6:1 Caribbean L Rev 428 at 439.
93. Irwin Toy, supra note 79.
94. Edwards Books, supra note 83.
95. Irwin Toy, supra note 79 at para 71.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. For discussions of Irwin Toy that raise a similar theme, see Elizabeth Shilton, “Charter
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Once characterized as an issue of competing constitutional rights and
interests, the Court’s statements in Irwin Toy about the need for deference in
evaluating the law become clearer.99 “When striking a balance between the
claims of competing groups,” the Court explained:
The choice of means, like the choice of ends, frequently will require an assessment
of conflicting scientific evidence and differing justified demands on scarce resources.
Democratic institutions are meant to let us share in the responsibility for these difficult choices. Thus, as courts review the results of the legislature’s deliberations, particularly with respect to the protection of vulnerable groups, they must be mindful
of the legislature’s representative function.100

In developing policy, the state is constantly forced to determine how best to meet
its obligations to its various constituencies, each of which might have constitutional
rights or interests at stake. These decisions are rarely made on the basis of an
evidentiary record that points in the direction of one “correct” outcome.101
The legislature is thus best positioned to make these initial decisions, with the
courts determining on judicial review whether the decision can be supported
under section 1.102
Irwin Toy also provides an example of a threat to constitutional interests that
can only be meaningfully addressed by the state.103 Although parents might have
a limited ability to prevent their children from being exposed to advertisements
that appear on television, full protection can only be effected by the state, which
has the ability to regulate entire industries. Accordingly, the intervention in Irwin
Toy can quite helpfully be understood through the lens of the protective function.
Similar themes emerge in Edwards Books. In that case, a number of store
owners charged with operating on a Sunday in violation of the Retail Business
Holidays Act104 challenged the statute under section 2(a) of the Charter, arguing
that their freedom of religion was infringed by the statute’s mandated “uniform

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Litigation and the Policy Processes of Government: A Public Interest Perspective” (1992)
30:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 501; Patrick J Monahan & Marie Finkelstein, “The Charter of Rights
and Public Policy in Canada” (1992) 30:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 501 at 530-31.
Irwin Toy, supra note 79 at para 79.
Ibid at para 89. For a more recent articulation, see Hutterian Brethren, supra note 79.
Irwin Toy, supra note 79 at para 35. See also Choudhry, “Legacy of Oakes,” supra note 15 at
524; Alexy, Theory, supra note 63.
Irwin Toy, supra note 79.
Cf our discussion of the German Constitutional Court’s statement in the First Abortion decision
that the greatest threats to constitutional interests emanate from the state in Part I(A), above.
RSO 1980, c 453.
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pause day.”105 Although the statute contained certain exceptions, the store
owners were unable to fit themselves within any of them. A majority of the
Court concluded that the statute violated the freedom of religion of store
owners and customers who practiced religions with Saturday as their holy
day, but upheld the violation under section 1.
In determining whether the violation of section 2(a) of the Charter was justified,
the majority noted that the government had chosen to enact legislation that applied only to the retail business sector.106 This choice, it explained, arose because
of concerns particular to that sector. Although a “uniform pause day” was in the
best interests of all employees, employees in the retail sector tended to be nonunionized, female, uneducated, and working in entry-level positions.107 They
were employees, a provincial Law Reform Commission report had noted, “whose
continued earnings are critical for family support, people who have the least mobility
in terms of job alternatives and are least capable of expressing themselves to redress
their grievances.”108 For these reasons, they were “especially vulnerable to subtle
and overt pressure from [their] employers.”109 There were, in other words, good
reasons for the state to extend protection to these employees. Therefore, not only
was creating a “uniform pause day” a pressing and substantial objective within
the meaning of section 1 of the Charter but the government’s choice of means—a
statute aimed at one particular group of employees—was also rationally connected
to its broader objective. The majority noted that although it was possible to conceive
of other ways in which the legislation might have been drafted, no straightforward
minimally impairing alternative could be readily identified. Chief Justice Dickson
also issued the following warning:
In interpreting and applying the Charter I believe that the courts must be cautious to
ensure that it does not simply become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll
back legislation which has as its object the improvement of the condition of less advantaged persons. When the interests of more than seven vulnerable employees in securing
a Sunday holiday are weighed against the interests of their employer in transacting business on a Sunday, I cannot fault the legislature for determining that the protection of
the employees ought to prevail. This is not to say that the legislature is constitutionally
obligated to give effect to employee interests in preference to the interests of the store

105.
106.
107.
108.

Edwards Books, supra note 83 at paras 67-69, 120.
Ibid at para 69.
Ibid at paras 69, 123, 135-37.
Ibid at para 135, citing Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Sunday Observance
Legislation (Toronto: Department of Justice, 1970) at 103-04.
109. Edwards Books, supra note 83 at para 123.
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owner for large retail operations, but only that it may do so if it wishes.110

As in the case of Irwin Toy, understanding Edwards Books through the lens
of the protective function brings additional clarity to the majority’s ruling.111 We
do not mean to suggest that the Court in Edwards Books found that the Charter
required the province to enact such legislation. Indeed, the above quote seems
to suggest quite the opposite. Nevertheless, protective overtones emerge strongly
from the majority’s section 1 analysis, though they are not explicitly recognized
or weighed as such by the majority.
Elements of the protective function could also be said to be at work in more
recent decisions of the Supreme Court. In Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr,112
one of the issues for the Court was the appropriateness of ordering the government
to request Omar Khadr’s repatriation as a remedy for constitutional violations
committed by the Canadian government during his detention at Guantanamo
Bay. Rather than providing Khadr with the remedy he requested, a remedy
that had been granted by both the Federal Court and the Federal Court of
Appeal,113 the Court concluded that “the separation of powers and the wellgrounded reluctance of courts to intervene in matters of foreign relations”
made declaratory relief a more appropriate remedy.114
Khadr is another example of a case in which the constitutional rights and
interests at stake can only be fully understood when the protective component of
the case is fully articulated. Not only did the Canadian government contribute to
the deprivation of Khadr’s rights, but it also failed to protect him in the face of a credible threat to his constitutional interests by a foreign state. Rather than straining to
understand the facts in Khadr using the “complicity” framework established by the
Court in Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),115 this case is
perhaps better understood as a rebuke of the Canadian’s government’s utter failure
to protect a child soldier who was subjected to torture by American authorities.116
110.
111.
112.
113.

Ibid at para 136.
See Choudhry, “Legacy of Oakes,” supra note 15 at 514.
Khadr SCC, supra note 83.
See Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FC 405, [2010] 1 FCR 34 (TD) [Khadr FC];
Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FCA 246, [2010] 1 FCR 73 [Khadr FCA].
114. Khadr SCC, supra note 83 at para 2.
115. Sujit Choudhry, “The Significance of Khadr, Part II”, University of Toronto Faculty of Law
Faculty Blog, online: <http://www.law.utoronto.ca/blog/faculty/significance-khadr-partii>; Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1
SCR 3.
116. See Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 SCR 44 (joint factum of
the interveners, The University of Toronto Faculty of Law – International Human Rights
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In the Federal Court hearing of the matter, in fact, the Court concluded that section 7
of the Charter imposed on the government “a duty to protect persons in Mr. Khadr’s
circumstances.”117 This, in turn, gave rise to a remedial order to repatriate.118
For the Supreme Court, there was no question that the government was
obliged do something to cure the section 7 violation that resulted from Canadian
officials furnishing the United States government with evidence obtained from
Khadr after he was subjected to sleep deprivation and other forms of torture.
However, the Court took a different approach to the section 7 analysis than
did the lower courts. It also reached a different result on the question of the
appropriate remedy.119 No mention was made of a “duty to protect” Khadr
grounded in section 7 of the Charter. Instead, the violation of Charter rights
was framed in strictly defensive terms. The Court did hold, however, that the
violation of Charter rights was ongoing, suggesting that some action would
be required to bring the rights violation to an end.
The difficulty with the Supreme Court’s analysis in this regard is that
the remedy granted does not correspond to the rights violation the Court
identifies.120 Although it could plausibly be argued that the state had violated
Khadr’s defensive rights, it was the breach of Khadr’s right to be protected by the
Canadian government that seemed to give rise to the remedy. If only defensive
rights were violated, it is not clear that declaratory relief of the nature ordered
in Khadr would be appropriate, even if the effects of the violation “continue[d]
to this day and may redound into the future.”121 The Court explained that its
declaration would “provide the legal framework for the executive to exercise
its functions and to consider what actions to take in respect of Mr. Khadr,

117.

118.
119.
120.
121.

Clinic and Human Rights Watch), online: David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights
<http://www.aspercentre.ca>; Khadr SCC, supra note 83 at paras 12-22; Audrey Macklin,
“Comment on Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr (2010),” (2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 295
at 328. For a discussion of the earlier phases of this litigation from the standpoint of the
protective function, see Craig Forcese, “The Obligation to Protect: The Legal Context for
Diplomatic Protection of Canadians Abroad” (2007) 57 UNBLJ 102.
Khadr FC, supra note 113 at para 71. The Federal Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment
below, concluded somewhat obliquely that the trial judge “did not err in law or fact when
he concluded that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Crown’s refusal to request
Mr. Khadr’s repatriation is a breach of Mr. Khadr’s rights under section 7 of the Charter.”
Khadr FCA, supra note 113 at para 60.
See Khadr FC, supra note 113 at para 78. See also Khadr FCA, supra note 113 at paras 56-60.
For a discussion of the problematic remedy aspect of Khadr, see Kent Roach, “The Supreme
Court’s Remedial Decision in the Insite Decision” (2012) 6 J Parliamentary & Pol L 238.
Macklin, supra note 116 at 328.
Khadr SCC, supra note 83 at para 31.
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in conformity with the Charter.”122 In other words, the Court seemed to say
that the government was required to exercise its protective function, though
the form of that protection was to be determined by the government, “in
conformity with the Charter.”
A similar disconnect between right and remedy is present in Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society (sub nom Insite).123 In Insite, the
Minister’s decision not to renew a safe injection facility’s exemption under the
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act124 (the CDSA) was challenged under section
7 of the Charter. The Court, relying on social science evidence that demonstrated
the effectiveness of the facility in reducing harm both to drug addicts and to the
broader community, held that the Minister’s decision violated the section 7 rights
of patients and employees of the facility. It went on to find that the violation
could not be justified under section 1 and that the proper remedy was to order
the Minister to renew the exemption.
The Court in Insite again took great pains to conceptualize the Charter
claim in defensive terms, treating the Minister’s failure to renew the exemption
as a decision that infringed Charter rights. One of the difficulties with this characterization, however, is that the remedy the Court ultimately ordered is not
cognizable under a classical liberal theory of rights. On the contrary, the remedy
granted can only be rationalized if the state has protective obligations grounded
in the constitution. While it is true that the statutory scheme at issue contemplated that exemptions might be made “if, in the opinion of the Minister, the
exemption is necessary for a medical or scientific purpose or is otherwise in the
public interest,”125 the Court grounded the obligation to renew the exemption in
the Charter and concluded that only positive action of a distinctly protective nature
could cure the Charter breach. Unless the Charter imposes an obligation of protection on the state, there could be no constitutional basis for requiring the Minister
to exercise his discretion.
If Insite is instead viewed as a case about the protective function, it is easier to
see how the failure to renew the exemption was problematic from a constitutional
standpoint, even under a deferential standard of review. When it enacted the CDSA,
the government included an exemption scheme that, in the Supreme Court’s own
words, “prevent[ed] the CDSA from applying where such action would be arbitrary,

122.
123.
124.
125.

Ibid at para 47.
Insite, supra note 83.
SC 1996, c 19 [CDSA].
Insite, supra note 83 at para 39.

1032 (2013) 50 osgoode Hall Law Journal

overbroad or grossly disproportionate in its effects.”126 Once the state had exercised
its protective function and created a scheme that contemplated an exemption
in these circumstances, and the evidence suggested that it was highly effective
in securing the constitutional interests of addicts and society more broadly, the
government was not permitted to revert to a punitive approach unless criminalization was a valid means of reconciling the various constitutional rights and
interests engaged by the scheme. Notably, the punitive model was not an option
where the evidence established that only an exemption would fulfill the government’s constitutional obligations. Within the structure of the scheme enacted
by Parliament, therefore, the logical remedy was to require the government to
grant the exemption.
A. The Protective Function and Section 1

This re-framing of Irwin Toy and Edwards Books also sheds new light on the
structure and function of the section 1 analysis. As in many countries, constitutional analysis in Canada proceeds in two stages. At the first stage, the claimant
must establish that her Charter rights have been infringed. Once an infringement
has been established, the burden shifts to the state to justify the Charter-infringing
conduct or legislation.127 Unjustified infringements entitle the claimant to a remedy.
When the analysis proceeds to the justification stage, the Court examines
whether the violation of Charter rights is “demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.” In Oakes, Justice Dickson (as he then was) explained the
significance of this phrase as follows:
Inclusion of these words as the final standard of justification for limits on rights and
freedoms refers the Court to the very purpose for which the Charter was originally
entrenched in the Constitution: Canadian society is to be free and democratic. The
Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity
of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of
a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social
and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups
in society. The underlying values and principles of a free and democratic society are
the genesis of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate
standard against which a limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its ef126. Ibid at para 113.
127. Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 5th ed (Toronto, Carswell, 2010)
at 6-7; Weinrib, “Section One,” supra note 92 at 472; Stephen Gardbaum, “Limiting
Constitutional Rights” (2007) 54:4 UCLA L Rev 789 at 799.
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fect, to be reasonable and demonstrably justified.128

As Justice Dickson points out, the values that underpin a “free and democratic
society” consist largely of the values embodied in the Charter’s substantive guarantees.129 This observation is significant: What could be a more principled basis
for limiting a constitutional right than finding another constitutional interest
in need of protection? Yet most Charter cases seem to assume that justification
involves defending the state’s decision to limit Charter rights in the service of
important but less than constitutional values and objectives. Since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Irwin Toy, moreover, courts have been relatively deferential to
the legislature at the justification stage if it is legislating in a challenging policy
area.130 This places courts in the position of deciding whether to uphold laws
that defeat our society’s most basic values in the name of objectives that, while
important, are not as significant as the constitutional right engaged.
Re-framing cases like Irwin Toy and Edwards Books to emphasize the protective
character of the legislation being upheld has the benefit of strengthening the logic
underlying the section 1 analysis in those cases. Rather than deferring to the state’s
assessment of when Charter rights may be limited so that the state can implement
its political agenda, what courts are doing in many cases is allowing elected representatives to determine, within certain boundaries, how to craft policy that most
appropriately balances the full range of constitutional rights and interests at stake.131
This more nuanced understanding of section 1 also suggests that we might want to be
somewhat more skeptical about upholding limits on Charter rights where no obvious
constitutional interest is served by the rights deprivation. Since constitutional rights
represent our society’s core values, we might regard with caution state policies that
violate constitutional rights without advancing some other interest of constitutional
status. Such policies, we might conclude, should less readily be upheld.
B. Deference and Judicial Activism

Somewhat counterintuitively, perhaps, recognition of the protective function would
be unlikely to increase, and may even defuse, the spectre of judicial activism in con-

128. Oakes, supra note 15 at para 64.
129. Weinrib, “Section One,” supra note 92 at 471.
130. Irwin Toy, supra note 79; Hutterian Brethren, supra note 79. There are notable exceptions to
this trend, which we do not explore here. See Choudhry, “Legacy of Oakes,” supra note 15;
David Wiseman, “Competence Concerns in Charter Adjudication: Countering the AntiPoverty Incompetence Argument” (2006) 51 McGill LJ 503.
131. Edwards Books, supra note 83 at para 136; Irwin Toy, supra note 79 at para 79.
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stitutional cases.132 It is often argued that judicial review is most problematic when
it requires courts to determine the scope of affirmative constitutional obligations
and to evaluate whether the state has satisfied those obligations.133 However, the
benefit of viewing the Court’s task in the more holistic manner suggested above
is that the state is very clearly the primary institution responsible for deciding
how to balance competing constitutional rights and interests. Of course, these
choices are made against the background of our constitutive commitments as a
society, and so the state is not free to balance constitutional rights and interests in
whatever way it deems politically expedient. But it is the Charter, not the judges
undertaking judicial review, that requires the state to strike the proper balance.
How, then, ought the state to conduct this reconciliation? It is important
to distinguish at this stage between “the question [of ] whether [the legislature]
has done too little in order to protect the endangered right”134—that is, whether
the state’s obligation of protection has been satisfied—and the related question
of whether the state has properly balanced the constitutional rights and interests at
stake in choosing to enact a new law (or regulation, or in making an administrative
decision). This second question arises when the state’s laws or actions are challenged
on the grounds that they violate an individual’s constitutional rights. If the answer to
such a challenge is that the state’s actions were taken to protect other constitutional
interests, then the question properly becomes one of balancing or reconciliation.
It should be noted at the outset that defensive rights have no automatic
claim to greater weight in this analysis than the constitutional interests that the
state has a constitutional obligation to protect. Rather, the relative weight to be
ascribed to a constitutional right or interest must be determined in the context of
the particular case.135 The use of the term “interest” simply reflects the fact that
132. There is no shortage of academic commentary on the dangers of judicial activism and the
corresponding need for greater deference to legislative choice. See e.g. Aileen Kavanagh,
“Judicial Restraint in the Pursuit of Justice” (2010) 60:1 UTLJ 23; Aileen Kavanagh,
“Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory” (2010) 126 Law Q Rev
222; Patrick J Monahan, “The Supreme Court of Canada in the 21st Century” (2001) 80
Can Bar Rev 374.
133. For a response to this “democratic objection,” see Michelman, “Liberal Political Justification,”
supra note 88. But see Kent Roach, “American Constitutional Theory for Canadians (And
the Rest of the World)” (2002) 52 UTLJ 503 at 506; Tushnet, Weak Courts, supra note
15; Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000).
134. Grimm, “Protective Function,” supra note 81 at 151.
135. Such a “contextual approach” is endorsed in, among other cases, Edmonton Journal v Alberta
(Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 paras 51-52, 64 DLR (4th) 577, Wilson J [Edmonton
Journal]; Thomson Newspapers Co v Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 SCR 877 at para 87,
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the individual has an interest in being protected against intrusion by a private
actor, against whom the individual cannot have constitutional rights.136
Using the standard Canadian proportionality analysis, the relevant inquiry
would proceed as follows. The Court would begin by taking a contextual approach
to the Charter analysis, which would require the Court to assess, at least in a
preliminary way, the weight of the constitutional rights and interests engaged.137
The Court would then determine whether the proposed state action was actually
protective; that is, whether it satisfied the objective of securing constitutional
interests, and whether the means chosen to pursue that objective were rationally
connected to the objective. Next, the Court would assess whether the state’s efforts
to secure constitutional interests were minimally impairing. Finally, the court would
inquire into whether the requirements of proportionality had been achieved.138
At this last stage, the Court would be required to conduct a final weighing of
the rights and interests involved.
The contextual dimension of this inquiry is significant. Despite the frequent
admonition that there is no “hierarchy of rights,”139 it may not be the case that all
constitutional rights and interests ought to be given equal weight in all cases in
which they come into conflict.140 This is not to say that constitutional rights and
interests can be placed in a hierarchy independently from the context in which
the conflict arises. No single right can be regarded as prima facie superior to any
other. Rather, in any given situation, it falls first to the state (and ultimately to
the courts if the government’s actions are judicially reviewed) to determine which
rights or interests are to be given precedence.141 These compromises are not easy
to make.142 It is for this reason that the state has the primary responsibility for
balancing competing rights and interests.143 At the same time, because balancing

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

159 DLR (4th) 385. See also Alexy, Theory, supra note 63; Dieter Grimm, “Proportionality in
Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence” (2007) 57:2 UTLJ 383 at 394 [Grimm,
“Proportionality”]; Choudhry, “Legacy of Oakes,” supra note 15; Wiseman, supra note 129.
See MacDonnell, “Protective Function,” supra note 4.
Weinrib, “Section One,” supra note 92 at 471.
See Hutterian Brethren, supra note 79; Oakes, supra note 15.
Gosselin (Tutor of ) v Quebec (AG), 2005 SCC 15, [2005] 1 SCR 238 at para 2. See also
Grimm, “Proportionality,” supra note 135 at 394.
See Edmonton Journal, supra note 135, Wilson J; Alexy, Theory, supra note 63; Grimm,
“Proportionality,” supra note 135 at 394.
Grimm, “Proportionality,” supra note 135 at 394.
Irwin Toy, supra note 79 at para 79.
Ibid; See generally Grimm, “Protective Function,” supra note 81. See also Alexy, Theory, supra
note 63.
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engages constitutional rights and interests, the constitution, as supreme law, provides
a “framework” within which these decisions are to be made.144
The reconciliation approach taken by the German Constitutional Court
adds additional rigour to the balancing exercise. Through the lens of the German
jurisprudence, we can see that the Canadian courts’ existing contextual approach
tends to conflate two distinct stages of analysis. First, what is the weight of each
constitutional right or interest at play? Second, how can the competing rights
and interests be reconciled, given their respective weights? While a variant of this
analysis sometimes occurs at the final stage of the Oakes analysis, the German jurisprudence suggests that the weight of the rights and interests engaged ought to play a
broad, framing role in the process of reconciliation. Though the Supreme Court of
Canada has expressed a commitment to a contextual approach, particularly in the
freedom of expression context,145 this aspect of the Charter analysis is often insufficiently articulated. What the German experience, and particularly the dissenting
opinion of Justice Böckenförde in the Second Abortion decision, shows is that this
analytical gain can be squandered if the second stage includes a re-weighing of the
rights and interests at stake. Proper balancing (or reconciliation) of rights requires
instead that each right be given its appropriate contextual weight prior to engaging in
reconciliation. It also requires accepting that each right will need to be diminished in
the reconciliation exercise in accordance with this predetermined weight.
Regardless of what role courts play, the protective function helps us to
better account for the complex range of constitutional rights and interests
engaged when courts evaluate state action for compliance with the Charter.
The concept of deference invites the state to be the primary actor in deciding
the hard question of how to govern in the face of competing basic values. As
the Supreme Court explained in R v Mills:
Courts do not hold a monopoly on the protection and promotion of rights and
freedoms; Parliament also plays a role in this regard and is often able to act as a significant ally for vulnerable groups … If constitutional democracy is meant to ensure
that due regard is given to the voices of those vulnerable to being overlooked by the
majority, then this court has an obligation to consider respectfully Parliament’s attempt to respond to such voices.146
144. Alexy, Theory, supra note 63 at 393. For a comparison of the German and Canadian
approaches, see Grimm, “Proportionality,” supra note 135.
145. Choudhry, “Legacy of Oakes,” supra note 15 at 514-15; Richard Moon, “Justified Limits on
Expression: The Collapse of the General Approach to Limits on Charter Rights” (2002) 40:3
& 4 Osgoode Hall LJ 336.
146. R v Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668 at para 58, 180 DLR (4th) 1. See also Irwin Toy, supra note 79
at para 79.
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Where the government has failed in its duty, the courts will direct the state to
fulfill its function.147 Even here, however, the government is left with a significant
degree of discretion.

III. A Synthetic Reading of the Abortion Decisions
As the German jurisprudence demonstrates, the protective function operates
along two dimensions. First, it imposes certain affirmative protective obligations
on the state where a constitutional rights-holder is peculiarly vulnerable to
the actions of private actors and the state is uniquely positioned to protect
core constitutional interests. Second, it identifies as constitutional certain
interests pursued by the state through measures that infringe constitutional
rights. This second dimension of the protective function often underlies the
section 1 analysis in Canadian constitutional law. We argue that making the
constitutional nature of rights-limiting purposes explicit helps in properly
understanding constitutional balancing under section 1 as a weighing of constitutional rights and interests on both sides of the scales.
Which of these two aspects of the protective function is foregrounded does
not depend on doctrinal considerations; rather, it seems to be contingent upon
litigation context. In cases where the state is alleged to have failed to fulfill its
protective obligations, the first aspect of the protective function shapes the
contours of the claim. When the state has taken action to protect constitutional
interests and in the course of so doing is alleged to have infringed defensive
rights, the second aspect predominates. Considering the abortion decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada and the German Constitutional Court together
allows us to see both aspects of the protective function at work and to assess
how the protective function interacts with defensive rights.
A synthetic reading of the abortion cases reveals that the same three constitutional
issues were before the courts in Morgentaler, Roe v Wade, Casey, and the two German Abortion decisions. First, what is the scope of a woman’s right to determine
whether she will carry a pregnancy to term? Second, what is the scope of the
state’s ability or obligation to regulate abortion to protect fetal life? Third, how
do we reconcile these rights and obligations?148 The first issue was foregrounded
147. Grimm, “Protective Function” supra note 81; Karin Graßhof, “The Duty to Protect and to
Ensure Human Rights under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany” in Eckart
Klein, ed, The Duty to Protect and to Ensure Human Rights: Colloquium (Berlin: Berlin Verlag
Arno Spitz, 2000) 41 at 48.
148. See Frank I Michelman “The protective function of the state in the United States and
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in the North American decisions, while the second issue was foregrounded in
the German decisions. In all of these decisions, however, the outcome ultimately
depended upon resolution of the third question. This insight emerges clearly only
when the decisions are viewed together.
If, as North American courts seem to suggest, judges actually subscribed to
a classical liberal view of constitutional rights, there should be no third issue. As
Wayne Sumner explains:
The liberal view has the simplest structure possible for a moral treatment of abortion. Since the stake that the fetus has in the decision is entirely discounted, abortion requires no special justification. The liberal thus makes a clean sweep of all moral
complications concerning abortion.149

In the US context, a woman’s right to choose would not be subject to any
limit, since there is no possible constitutional basis for protecting fetal life, and in
the Canadian context there would be no need to reconcile conflicting rights either as part of a balancing exercise internal to section 7 or under section 1.150 The
government would be left to argue that the significance of fetal life, though not
constitutionally protected, was sufficiently important to warrant the curtailing
of the pregnant woman’s rights.
Instead, we know that abortion rights advocacy is immeasurably more
complex. Canadian courts do not actually adhere to a classical liberal view of
constitutional rights in abortion cases. Rather, they introduce the protective
dimension of rights via a division-of-powers analysis (especially involving the
criminal law power)151 and via an inquiry into legislative purpose under section
7 or section 1.152 This protective dimension plays a powerful, albeit undertheorized, role in the courts’ reasoning.
Frank Michelman makes a similar point in the context of the American
abortion cases.153 He suggests that there is a protective dimension to the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court in which a woman’s right to access abortion
is curtailed in the name of protecting the sanctity of life.154 He concludes that

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Europe: the constitutional question” in Georg Nolte, ed, European and US Constitutionalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 156 [Michelman, “Protective Function”].
Sumner, supra note 17 at 19.
For a discussion of the history of balancing under section 7, see Vanessa A MacDonnell, “R
v Sinclair: Balancing Individual Rights and Societal Interests Outside of Section 1 of the
Charter” (2012) 38:1 Queen’s LJ 137.
See R v Morgentaler [1993] 3 SCR 463, 107 DLR (4th) 537 [Morgentaler 1993, cited to SCR].
See Morgentaler, supra note 1.
Michelman, “Protective Function,” supra note 147 at 174.
Ibid at 174-75, citing Roe v Wade, supra note 8.

MacDonnell & Hughes, german abortion decisions 1039

in the United States, the protective function is best understood as an “underenforced constitutional right;”155 that is, the mere absence of “direct judicial
enforcement”156 is not an indication of the right’s non-existence.157 Rather, it may
simply be that the protective function is directed primarily to the state’s legislative
branch, to be taken into account when it makes policy choices, but even to judges
“when the principle is invoked in some way other than as a ground for direct judicial
enforcement.”158 This approach, Michelman explains, raises fewer “institutional”159
concerns than a right to protection that is directly enforceable by the courts.160
How can comparative constitutional law assist in the development of a
robust constitutional theory of reproductive rights? We argue that a synthetic
reading of the abortion decisions renders visible the tension between defensive
rights and protective obligations that underlies the abortion jurisprudence in all
three jurisdictions, though our focus is on Germany and Canada. Comparative
inquiry not only explains what Canadian courts are seeking to balance but also
makes clear that these competing interests have constitutional weight.161 Like
our German counterparts, then, we must account for the implicit protective
constitutional aspect of reproductive rights cases. The First Abortion decision
demonstrates the risks of failing to do so. There, the (respondents’) liberal defensive rights theory failed German women because it was not responsive to the
Court’s focus on protective rights. The gains made in the Second Abortion decision
can be attributed in part to an emphasis on the protective interests of women in the
abortion context, as well as a clearer articulation of the impact of forced pregnancy
continuation on women’s defensive rights. In sum, we argue that the comparative lens
might offer two types of insights for Canadian law. First, it might tell us something
about the vulnerabilities in the classical liberal position. Second, it might tell us
which arguments are not essential in developing reproductive rights advocacy
that secures the woman’s interest in reproductive choice.
The German abortion decisions suggest that there are at least three elements
of existing reproductive rights advocacy in Canada that may prove vulnerable in
the long run. The most important of these is the insistence on conceptualizing
the fetus as a legal nullity. The German comparator demonstrates that strong
155. Ibid at 175 [quotation marks omitted]. Michelman is building here on a concept developed
by Lawrence Sager.
156. Ibid at 176.
157. Ibid at 177.
158. Ibid at 176.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
161. Choudhry, “Legacy of Oakes,” supra note 15 at 514.
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reproductive rights protection is not dependent on conceptualizing the fetus as
a legal nullity. The claim that the fetus is a legal nullity is vulnerable because it
removes the legal framework very far from the lived experience of women and
from the basic moral intuition of individuals. Constitutional doctrine seems to
be most stable when it tracks basic moral intuitions and the lived experience of
individuals.162 One of the key insights of feminism is that we must pay attention
to the lived reality and experiences of women.163 Women do not experience
pregnancy as a nullity, regardless of whether the pregnancy is intended or
unintended, and whether the woman wants to carry the pregnancy to term or
seeks to terminate it.164 Women experience pregnancy as highly significant.165
This is not the same as the anti-choice suggestion that abortion is traumatic or
that there are negative mental health effects that result from abortion. For most
women, neither is the case.166 However, reproductive rights advocacy predicated
on a claim that a pregnancy should be considered legally equivalent to other
minor medical interventions is vulnerable to rejection by courts, even if the
medical analogy may be apt.
162. For a sophisticated analysis of the relationship between law reform and basic moral intuition,
see Paul H Robinson & John M Darley, “Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy” (2007) 81:1 S Cal L Rev 1. See also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, “Roe
Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash” (2007) 42 Harv CR-CLL Rev 373 [Post
& Siegel, “Roe Rage”].
163. See e.g. Jennifer S Hendricks, “Pregnancy, Equality, and U.S. Constitutional Law” in
Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez & Tsvi Kahana, eds, Feminist Constitutionalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 263.
164. The commitment to the notion that the fetus is a legal nullity has complex legal
consequences. Because it casts birth as a binary moment before which the fetus is “part of ”
the pregnant woman and after which it becomes a separate human being with personhood,
the law has great difficulty conceptualizing harms done to the fetus and the pregnant woman
in the course of giving birth. See R v Sullivan, [1991] 1 SCR 489, 55 BCLR (2d) 1. The
Supreme Court of Canada recently demonstrated the tenuous nature of this consensus when
it concluded that the offence of disposing the dead body of a child included within its ambit
a fetus that would “likely have been born alive.” R v Levkovic, 2013 SCC 25 at para 13, 106
WCB (2d) 51.
165. John Lydon and others have remarked that:
Being pregnant and having a baby represent clearly defined goals for many women (Lalos,
Jacobsson, Lalos, & von Schoultz, 1985; Pervin, 1989), but these same events can be sources
of significant stress not only for those who elect to have the baby (Lobel, 1994) but also for
those deciding to terminate the pregnancy (Adler, 1992).

See John Lydon et al, “Pregnancy Decision Making as a Significant Life Event: A
Commitment Approach” (1996) 71:1 J Personality & Soc Psychol 141.
166. Gail Erlick Robinson et al, “Is there an ‘Abortion Trauma Syndrome’? Critiquing the
Evidence” (2009) 17:4 Harv Rev Psychiatry 268 at 269.
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A second, related way in which reproductive rights advocacy departs from
moral intuition and the way that abortion is experienced concerns gestational
stages. If the fetus has no legal cognizance and birth is the binary moment in which
a legal non-entity becomes a legal entity, the fetus should be legally irrelevant for
the entire pregnancy. Yet courts have shown a distinct willingness to treat early
pregnancy differently from later pregnancy. This view accords with women’s
experience. An abortion performed in week eight of the pregnancy is not the
same as one carried out in week twenty-two. The difference arises in part from the
different medical impact of the procedure itself, but it is also likely related to the
reasons for which the abortion is sought and the degree to which the pregnancy
is experienced physically and emotionally.
Again, reading the German and Canadian jurisprudence together and
considering their impact on the lived reality of women in both countries, it
appears that taking a gestational development approach does not necessarily result
in more restricted abortion access, nor does an approach based on a binary constitutional moment of birth result in freedom from gestation-based incursions into
reproductive choice. We are of the view that the widespread legislative and judicial
preference for gestational approaches is grounded in lived experience and basic
moral intuition and may therefore be difficult to unseat. Respecting this fact would
therefore appear to be most likely to lead to stable and robust jurisprudence.
Third, there seems to be a frequent confounding of the legal question of who
is the appropriate decision maker when it comes to accessing abortion and the
moral question of why a woman seeks to access abortion. It is generally assumed
that if a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy is legally hers alone, the
reason for which she is seeking to access abortion is removed from the scope of
public discourse. While there are compelling reasons for the first argument, the
second is neither necessary nor beyond dispute. Women choose abortion because
of reasons that are compelling to them, but those reasons may not be compelling
to others. Liberal democracies should protect the right of women to be the sole
legal decision maker. The question of where, when, and how people might morally
disagree with her choices is obviously complex, but not necessarily outside of the
realm of permissible discourse.167
167. The Constitutional Court of South Africa has also made a statement to this effect:
The hallmark of an open and democratic society is its capacity to accommodate and manage
difference of intensely-held world views and lifestyles in a reasonable and fair manner. The objective of the Constitution is to allow different concepts about the nature of human existence
to inhabit the same public realm, and to do so in a manner that is not mutually destructive
and that at the same time enables government to function in a way that shows equal concern
and respect for all.
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The question becomes whether it is possible to develop a robust constitutional
theory of reproductive rights that reflects the best insights of the abortion jurisprudence in Germany and Canada (and, to a lesser extent, the US). One of the
advantages of tackling the tension between women’s rights and fetal interests head-on
is that we can bring the law’s commitment to probing, rational discourse to bear on
the issues. A related advantage is that we can consider the question both from the
perspective of individual rights-holders and through a more social or systemic lens.
We now consider the three issues before the courts in constitutional abortion cases
using a synthetic reading of the cases.
A. What is the scope of the right of a woman to determine
whether to carry a pregnancy to term?

Applying basic constitutional principles, there can be no question that a pregnant
woman is a full constitutional rights-holder. Her pregnancy in no way diminishes
her citizenship or constitutional status. There is no room in constitutional doctrine
for “woman as vessel” jurisprudence. While the German decisions demonstrate
the difficulties with allocating constitutional rights to an entity that is not fully
capable of holding rights, the Canadian jurisprudence shows that the constitutional
analysis can be distorted by an incomplete accounting of the constitutional rights
of the pregnant woman that are at stake. The constitutional interests of a pregnant
woman will likely sound in a variety of individual constitutional rights related to her
personhood, autonomy, equality, privacy, health, liberty, psychological well-being,
and human dignity. The exact scope of these rights will need to be determined by
domestic constitutional law. Morgentaler, it will be noted, speaks only to a very
few of these rights.168
Contrary to the experience in Nazi Germany, most states and all Western
democracies grant women the absolute right not to have a pregnancy terminated
See Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (CCT 60/04), [2005] ZACC
19, 2006 (3) B Const LR 355 (CC) at para 95. Thank you to Iain Benson for pointing us to
this source.
168. For critiques of the scope of the Morgentaler decision, see Sanda Rodgers, “Misconceptions:
Equality and Reproductive Autonomy in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2006) 33 Sup Ct
L Rev (2d) 271; Hester Lessard, “Relationship, Particularity, and Change: Reflections on R.
v. Morgentaler and Feminist Approaches to Liberty” (1991) 36:2 McGill LJ 263; Beverley
Baines, “Abortion, Judicial Activism and Constitutional Crossroads” (2004) 53 UNBLJ 157;
Moira L McConnell & Lorenne Clark, “Abortion Law in Canada: A Matter of National
Concern” (1991) 14:1 Dalhousie LJ 81. For a detailed review of the Morgentaler judgment,
see Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, “The Morgentaler Judgment: Constitutional Rights,
Legislative Intention, and Institutional Design” (1992) 42:1 UTLJ 22.
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against her will. This means that the state does not generally claim an interest
in, for example, avoiding guardianship obligations or health care costs where
the woman may be in a poor position to parent the child or where the child is
expected to have significant health challenges. In order to determine the scope of
the pregnant woman’s right to decide whether to terminate the pregnancy, it is likely
important to consider the purpose and effect of the proposed state limit on her decision. Both the German Constitutional Court in the Second Abortion decision and
the United States Supreme Court in Casey established similar standards for assessing
restrictions placed on a woman’s ability to choose to terminate a pregnancy, expressed
as “exactability” in Germany169 and “undue burden” in the United States.170 Without
seeking to endorse either of these standards, we are struck by the German Constitutional Court’s very limited understanding of what is exacted from a woman who is
forced to carry a pregnancy to term and to parent a child. There is a very significant
body of psychological, sociological, and medical literature about the impact of
pregnancy, childbirth, and parenting on women.171 This needs to become part of
the record. In the absence of this kind of evidence, constitutional cases are proceeding without a solid factual matrix for determining whether pregnancy, childbirth, or
parenting can ever be exactable. From a principled—not to mention historical
and empirical—perspective it is difficult to overstate the impact of pregnancy,
childbirth, and parenting on the biographies of individual women and on
gendered role allocations in society.
Beyond the individual rights analysis (which tends to be weakened by the
frequency of abstract judicial review in abortion litigation), the systemic policy
169. Second Abortion decision, supra note 2 at para 123.
170. Casey, supra note 9 at 877.
171. For the impact of these factors on women’s health, see e.g. Valerie Beral, “Long Term Effects
of Childbearing on Health” (1985) 39:4 J Epidemiology & Community Health 343; MF
Fathalla, “Contraception and Women’s Health,” (1993) 49:1 Brit Med Bull 2. For their
impact on women’s psychological well-being, see e.g. Nancy Felipe Russo & Kristin L Zierk,
“Abortion, Childbearing, and Women’s Well-Being” (1992) 23:4 Prof Psychol: Research &
Prac 269; Ross B Wilkinson, “Changes in psychological health and the marital relationship
through childbearing: Transition or process as stressor?” (1995) 47:2 Aust J Psychol 86;
Margaret A De Judicibus & Marita P McCabe, “Psychological Factors and the Sexuality
of Pregnant and Postpartum Women” (2002) 39:2 J Sex Res 94; Sofia Gameiro, Mariana
Moura-Ramos & Maria Cristina Canavarro, “Maternal adjustment to the birth of a child:
Primiparity versus multiparity” (2009) 27:3 J Reprod & Infant Psychol 269. For their impact
on women’s economic well-being, see e.g. Amalia R Miller, “The effects of motherhood timing
on career path.” (2011) 24:3 J Pop Econ 1071; Catalina Ameudo-Dorantes & Jean Kimmel,
“The Motherhood Wage Gap for Women in the United States: The Importance of College
and Fertility Delay” (2005) 3:1 Rev Econ Household 17; Hiromi Taniguchi, “The Timing of
Childbearing and Women’s Wages” (1999) 61:4 J Marriage & Fam 1008.
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reasons for supporting a woman’s right to make these determinations must be
made explicit. Here, many of the well-established arguments continue to be relevant.
One of the reasons why there are not significant differences in women’s ability to
access abortion across the three comparator jurisdictions, we suspect, is that the
social cost of not making abortion widely accessible in the early stages of pregnancy
is extremely high. At the time of Roe v Wade, the First Abortion decision, and
Morgentaler, the memory of the devastating effects of women obtaining illegal
abortions was still fresh. A more recent practical limit on the ability of the state to
regulate abortion is the fact that medical abortion is widely available and frequently
used.172 The historical record and the current state of medical abortions both
point in the same direction: Women will access abortion whether or not the state
seeks to regulate it, and it is not in the interest of any state to enact laws that
would cause more women to resort to illegal or unsafe abortions.
In the Second Abortion decision, both the majority and the dissent were of
the view that a woman was at the very least in the best, if not the only, position
to determine whether she was able to carry a pregnancy to term. The majority
was concerned, however, that removing a woman’s decision from the scope of
judicial review altogether while at the same time articulating a legal standard
for the decision would undermine the rule of law. In Morgentaler, the issue of
who was the most appropriate decision maker was replaced by the question of
whether a legal mechanism could be devised that allowed for review without
imposing undue delay. Clearly, a significant number of judges were concerned
that permitting women to make the decision of whether to carry a pregnancy to
term without review posed a threat to either good decision making, the authority
of the law, or both. The frequent resort to mandatory counselling suggests that
legislators often share this concern. The key question is what restrictions, if any,
the state may impose on the woman in order to protect fetal life. We examine
this question now. To summarize our analysis so far, a synthetic reading of the
comparative abortion jurisprudence suggests that the constitutionally required
scope of a woman’s right to choose is large and should be understood as being
anchored in a panoply of core constitutional rights.

172. Maria M Fernandez et al, “Assessing the Global Availability of Misoprostol” (2009) 105 Int’l
J Gynecology & Obstetrics 180. But see Joanna N Erdman et al, “Medication Abortion in
Canada: A Right-to-Health Perspective” (2008) 98 Am J Pub Health 1764.
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B. What is the scope of permissible abortion regulation aimed
at protecting fetal life?

We know from the German decisions that the state can fulfill its protective function
in a variety of ways. We can safely assume that the First Abortion decision will
continue to be an outlier. It seems inconceivable that a Canadian court would
require the re-criminalization of abortion. The inappropriateness of mandatory
criminalization is evident from the German jurisprudence in at least two ways.
First, the allocation of constitutional rights to an entity that is not considered
to be a rights-holder for any other purpose undermines the coherence of the
law. Resort to the objective normative framework theory of the constitution is less
troubling doctrinally, but makes it difficult to rationalize why the state’s protective
obligation imposes obligations on individual citizens, especially where this burden
has a differential impact on group of citizens who are protected by constitutional
and statutory anti-discrimination provisions. Equality arguments might usefully be
brought to bear on this discussion.173
Second, as the dissenters point out in the Second Abortion decision,
criminalization downloads the state’s constitutional obligation onto individuals
who are themselves vulnerable.174 Criminalization is thus inappropriate because
it allocates individual blame for the state’s failure to live up to its own symbolic
commitments. On the other hand, imposing a constitutional obligation on the
state to promote a child- and pregnancy-friendly society does not raise the same
concerns. Moreover, the German experience suggests that the most effective
approach to protecting fetal life is to adopt measures that provide robust social
supports to women.175 Recognizing that there may be multiple ways for a government to exercise its protective function, however, our objective here is to canvass
the range of possible abortion regulations that a Canadian court giving recognition
to the protective function might be prepared to uphold.
We have argued that it would be helpful for Canadian constitutional law to recognize the protective function, in part because it lends coherence to the jurisprudence and
in part because it is easier to articulate and weigh the boundaries of an express interest
than to respond to an interest that is implicit and amorphous but powerful nonetheless.
173. For criticism of the Supreme Court of Canada’s failure to deal with the equality dimensions
of the abortion issue, see Rodgers, supra note 168.
174. As Hendricks, Rodgers, and Kaposy and Downie point out, this vulnerability has
“intersecting” dimensions. See Hendricks, supra note 163 at 274; Rodgers, supra note 168 at
283; Kaposy & Downie, supra note 22.
175. For a discussion of the relationship between the protective function and socioeconomic
rights, see MacDonnell, “Protective Function,” supra note 4.
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It should be noted that from a biological perspective, the legal debate about
the beginning of life is incongruous. A fetus is not abiogenetic; rather, it is the
product of continued growth of living cells from other living cells. The attribution
of “life,” or of “not-life,” to this entity, is therefore a legal construct rather than a
factual reality. As with any other legal construct, it is subject to policy-based
development and revision. The common law position in Canada is clear: A fetus
is not a discrete rights-holder unless subsequently born alive.176 It will be recalled
that a very similar legal starting point did not keep the German court from
recognizing either that the fetus had a right to life or that the constitution’s
normative framework suggested a valid state interest in the fetus.
The dissenting judges in Morgentaler similarly had no difficulty recognizing
the abortion provisions of the Criminal Code as a valid exercise of criminal law.177
Moreover, a majority of the Court held that the protection of the fetus was a legitimate
state interest,178 reminding us that the state can protect interests not directly related
to constitutional rights-holders. In our view, one of the strengths of recognizing the
protective function is that it helps us understand the legal status of protective action
by the state. Beyond this, it allows us to impose appropriate limits on it.
It is difficult to conceive of any theory of the protection of fetal life without
having recourse to religious tenets or symbolic value statements of the kind the
German Court made in the First Abortion decision. The secular state may well
have a commitment to contributing to a child-friendly society, but it is difficult
to see how it could have a direct and tangible, rather than a symbolic, interest in
the outcome of the pregnancy of any one of its female citizens. The onus should
be on any state seeking to regulate abortion to articulate a constitutional theory
of the protection of fetal life. Counterintuitively, this onus is more likely to be
imposed in a constitutional discourse that recognizes a protective function.
In locating the high water mark of possible regulation, it is important to note
that the vast majority of abortions are performed in the early stages of pregnancy.179
176. See e.g. Dobson (Litigation Guardian of ) v Dobson, [1999] 2 SCR 753 at para 25, 174 DLR
(4th) 1.
177. Morgentaler, supra note 1 at paras 207-10, McIntyre J.
178. Kaposy & Downie, supra note 22 at 281.
179. The United States Center for Disease Control most recently reported an incident rate of
1.3 per cent for late-term abortions. See Karen Pazol et al, Centre for Disease Control,
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), “Abortion Surveillance — United States,
2009”, Surveillance Summaries 61(SS08) 1-44 (23 November 2012), online: <http://www.
cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6108a1.htm?s_cid=ss6108a1_w>. This appears to be
true internationally. The Law Commission of Victoria cites 0.7 per cent as the incidence of
late-term abortions there. Victorian Law Reform Commission, Law of Abortion: Final Report
(Victorian Law Reform Commission: Victorian Government Printer, 2008) at 36.
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At this stage, the state is faced with practical, political, and legal obstacles to
regulating abortion. It is worth asking, however, to what extent a court recognizing the protective function would uphold some degree of abortion regulation.
While we are not aware of the practice of all abortion providers in Canada, we
suspect that the situation at the local Morgentaler clinic is typical: Counselling is
offered to all women accessing abortion. It not only includes information about
the procedure, but also provides an opportunity to review the decision to terminate
the pregnancy and to offer advice on contraception. We believe that if this practice
were translated into a regulatory requirement, such a requirement would likely
be upheld as a valid use of the protective function.
Justice Wilson indicated in Morgentaler that the state’s interest in the fetus
becomes more “compelling” as the pregnancy progresses.180 This view is consistent
with Roe v Wade and with the Second Abortion decision.181 It also aligns with public
opinion on abortion, which is more pro-choice in the early stages of pregnancy,
while a plurality favours more regulation later in the pregnancy.182 The constitutional basis for this claim continues to be uncertain if we maintain that the fetus
has no legally cognizable status. For some, the issue is viability. If the fetus is viable
outside the womb, it should be possible to force the woman to carry the pregnancy
to term. This intuition appears to arise from a sense that a viable fetus has some
potential existence independent of the pregnant woman and is thus more closely
analogous to a constitutional rights-holder.
Reproductive rights advocates have rightly pointed to the misery of women
who discover their pregnancy late or have psychological difficulties accepting the
reality of their pregnancy as a reason for resisting gestational limits. These cases
need to be considered. From the standpoint of the state’s protective obligations,
however, they may be insufficient to defend a rule that places no limits on late
term abortions for psychosocial reasons in adult women who were aware of the
pregnancy and who faced no state-imposed or state-tolerated delays or obstacles.
On the other hand, gestational limits applied to minors or in situations where
the delay or obstacle is attributable to the state would not, it would seem, meet a
constitutional standard that appropriately reconciles the interests at stake.
180. Morgentaler, supra note 1 at para 257.
181. In fact, Justice Wilson cites American case law in her judgment, as do some of the other
judges. Ibid at paras 200, 258.
182. See most recently, “Canadians Have Mixed Feelings on Abortion, But Shun a New
Debate” Angus Reid (28 January 2013), online: <http://www.angus-reid.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/01/2013.01.28_Abortion_CAN.pdf>.
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Others have expressed concerns that gestational limits would be applied in
cases of potential fetal pathology, resulting in the abortion of healthy fetuses prior
to the gestational limit because the woman cannot wait for the more reliable, later
diagnostic test.183 This concern would clearly need to be addressed and a rule that is
responsive to diagnostic realities would need to be articulated. While it does not
support a principled argument against gestational limits per se, it strongly supports
a contextual argument against gestational limits in fetal pathology situations.
From a practical perspective, there are very few late-term abortion providers
in North America, and an even smaller number of practitioners who are prepared
to perform abortions after twenty-four weeks for psychosocial reasons.184 Thus,
even if a constitutional right to such an abortion existed, it is unlikely to be effective.
The question is whether there is sufficient value in the principled argument against
gestational limits to warrant a struggle for a right that is likely to be practically illusory.
It seems to us possible that the state would be able to articulate a constitutional
theory of protection of the fetus in the late stages of pregnancy that would be consistent
with what Robert Post and Reva Siegel refer to as “democratic constitutionalism.”185
Their basic premise is that “the authority of the Constitution depends on its
democratic legitimacy.”186 Democratic legitimacy does not depend upon majoritarian support of every policy position, but instead suggests that courts ought not to
depart so far from majoritarian values that it undermines the democratic legitimacy
of the constitution more broadly.187 Even assuming that the state can validly legislate to protect fetal life in the late stages of pregnancy, there is some question
whether the US standard of viability provides a useful measuring stick. Viability
is of course subject to medical developments. There is also disagreement about
183. ACG Breeze et al, “Palliative care for prenatally diagnosed lethal fetal abnormality” (2007)
92:1 Arch Dis Child Fetal Neonatal Ed F56 at F57.
184. The Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada (ARCC) reports that there are no providers in
Canada who will perform abortions for psychosocial reasons after twenty weeks, but that
the occasional Canadian woman seeking such an abortion would be sent to the United
States. See Joyce Arthur, “At the Heart of the Abortion Issue” Abortion Rights Coalition of
Canada (4-6 February 2006), online: <http://www.arcc-cdac.ca/editor.html>. In the United
States, only 8 per cent of providers perform abortions after twenty-four weeks for any reason,
indicating a recent decline. Rachel K Jones et al, “Abortion in the United States: Incident and
Access to Services, 2005” (2008) 40:1 Perspectives on Sexual & Reprod Health 6 at 14, 15.
Gestational Limits are a key reason for refusing to provide an abortion. Diana Green Foster,
Loren M Dobkin & Ushma D Upadhayay, “Denial of Abortion Care Due to Gestational Age
Limits” (2013) 87:1 Contraception 3.
185. Post & Siegel, “Roe Rage,” supra note 162.
186. Ibid at 374.
187. Ibid.
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whether the occasional seriously challenged but surviving infant (e.g., born at
twenty-two weeks) or the premature but generally surviving infant (e.g., born at
twenty-eight weeks) should be the measure.188
The comparative view thus suggests that criminalization is neither required
nor constitutionally valid, but that counselling requirements and some limits on
late-term abortions for psychosocial reasons might pass constitutional muster in
the absence of other factors such as youth or illness. Procedural requirements
should continue to be reviewed both for colourability and for adverse effects.189
This is consistent with existing abortion practice as well as a developmental view
of pregnancy. It is supported by women’s experience of pregnancy as well as
the existing jurisprudence.
C. How do we constitutionally reconcile these rights and
obligations?

Where constitutional rights and interests collide, the courts in Canada and in
Germany have been clear that one right or interest does not simply trump the
other. However, in this case we are not dealing with two constitutional rightsholders. The fetus may fall within the protective sphere of the state, but it is not
an independent rights-holder.
In the vast majority of cases, the balancing of rights and interests will need
to be resolved in favour of the pregnant woman. This is true in the early stages
of pregnancy not only for legal and constitutional reasons but also for practical
and political ones. In later pregnancy, the reasons for which an abortion is sought
may become relevant, as would the woman’s individual life circumstances. The
constitutionally protected sphere of girls and young women would have to
be greater to account for the differential health and capacity issues of this
demographic.190 Also, the state would have the burden of demonstrating that
any delay in obtaining an abortion cannot be attributed to inadequate access,
administrative hurdles, or the woman’s social disadvantage.
Finally, it is important to note that in the German context, the protective
function is embedded within a constitutional framework that also imposes
socioeconomic obligations on the state. The German position that the best
way to reduce abortions is through the adoption of woman-friendly policies,
while difficult to demonstrate empirically, has the advantage of respecting the
188. I Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, “Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution”
(2011) 39 JL Med & Ethics 235 at 236.
189. Morgentaler 1993, supra note 151 at para 47.
190. See generally R v DB, 2008 SCC 25, [2008] 2 SCR 3.
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choice of the individual rights-holder. It also recognizes that the interests of the
pregnant woman and the state’s interest in the life of the fetus are often aligned.
Government policy must take cognizance of this fact. To the extent that a state is
committed to protecting fetal life, it ought also to commit to protecting women and
to removing, to the extent possible, the social reasons that may result in unwanted
pregnancies, such as obstacles to accessing contraception, sexual violence against
women, and economic disadvantage.191 While the Supreme Court of Canada has
clearly given constitutional weight to fetal interests in the abortion jurisprudence,
it has not given adequate weight to the state’s obligation to create a woman-,
child-, and pregnancy-friendly society. This necessarily impacts upon whether
a woman can be forced to carry a pregnancy to term against her wishes and the
process of reconciling the rights and interests engaged by this very contentious
issue. Any future Canadian jurisprudence on these matters must develop a more
nuanced account of the state’s protective function, one that is focused not only
on prenatal life but also on the social dimensions of pregnancy.192
The resulting scope of constitutionally valid regulation appears to be small. It
would affect adult women who seek to access abortion for psychosocial reasons at
an advanced stage of pregnancy. While articulating legal limits to abortion for this
group might be constitutionally possible, it is of no great practical consequence.

IV. Conclusion
Despite their controversial nature, the German abortion decisions provide new
doctrinal tools that can be brought to bear on a conceptually fraught area of
Canadian constitutional doctrine. These tools play an important role in making
the case for a robust right of access to abortion that can withstand changes in
political fortune. A reproductive rights strategy that depends upon characterizing
the fetus as a legal nullity is vulnerable because it avoids the difficult questions
around abortion rather than confronting them. By insisting upon a constitutional
doctrine that makes visible the full range of constitutional rights and interests at
stake, we can begin the project of determining, in a contextually sensitive manner,
how to develop advocacy positions that connect with the lived realities of
women and at the same time safeguard the significant advances made in
securing reproductive freedom for women.

191. Rodgers, supra note 168 at 283-84.
192. Ibid.

